U.C.C. Survey: General Provisions, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title by Frisch, David
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1989
U.C.C. Survey: General Provisions, Bulk Transfers,
and Documents of Title
David Frisch
University of Richmond, dfrisch@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Frisch & John D. Wladis, U.C.C. Survey: General Provisions, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 44 Bus. Law. 1445 (1989).
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and 
Documents of Title 
By David Frisch*and John D. Wladis** 
This survey reviews recent case law and related developments under articles 
1, 2, 6, and 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." or "Code"). 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
There were no cases of significant interest under article 1 during the period of 
this survey. 
ARTICLE II-SALES OF GOODS 
CONTRACT FORMATION AND TERMS 
Statute of Frauds 
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from this year's statute of 
frauds cases is that the traditional sales model embraced by U.C.C. section 
2-201 will make it increasingly difficult for courts to apply the statute to non-
traditional documentation. Consider, for example, Procyon Corp. v. Compo-
nents Direct, Inc. 1 There the "writing in confirmation of the contract" that was 
found to satisfy section 2-201(2)2 was an irrevocable letter of credit issued by the 
•Mr. Frisch is a member of the Florida and Rhode Island bars and professor of law at the Widener 
University School of Law (formerly known as Delaware Law School of Widener University) . 
.. Mr. Wladis is a member of the New York bar and associate professor of law at the Widener 
University School of Law. 
The following people contributed to the preparation of this article: Richard M. Alderman, Steven 
L. Harris, Donald R. Hobbs (who also contributed to last year's survey but was incorrectly 
identified as "John R. Hobbs"), Thomas J. Holdych, Diane Modes, Gary L. Monserud, Janet 
Leach Richards, Linda D. Sartin, W. Clark Watson, and Peter Winship. The portion of the article 
on Bulk Transfers was prepared by Steven L. Harris with the assistance of Linda D. Sartin. 
Authors' note: All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1987 Official Text, 
unless otherwise noted. 
1. 249 Cal. Rptr. 813, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
2. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) provides: 
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and 
sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its 
contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection ( 1) against such party unless written notice 
of objection to its contents is given within to days after it is received. 
1445 
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buyer's bank to the seller's bank. The Jetter of cr~dit included a description of 
the contract's subject matter, sales price, date of delivery, identification of the 
parties, and the bank's warranty that all requests for payment in accordance 
with the terms of sale would be promptly fulfilled. But where was the buyer's 
signature? After all, a confirmatory memorandum under subsection (2) must be 
"sufficient against the sender" under subsection ( 1) and that subsection clearly 
requires a signature.3 Not so, said the court. To import that requirement into 
subsection (2) "defeats the goal of quick, informal confirmations of business 
deals, and Jacks support in the Commercial Code."4 Despite this erroneous 
reading of the section,5 the court went on to decide that the credit had indeed 
been "signed" by the buyer.6 The bank acted as the buyer's agent when it sent 
the credit so its signature was thus adopted by the buyer. 
Although the court's analysis is open to question, the result accords with 
reason. Certainly the establishment of a credit provides us with good reason to 
believe that a contract exists. Nevertheless, to preclude proof of that contract 
seems more likely to aid in the perpetration of a fraud than in its prevention. In 
this regard the situation is not much different from those singled out for 
exceptional treatment in section 2-201(3). 7 The real problem with section 2-201 
might be not its presence within the Code, as some have suggested,8 but, rather, 
its specificity. Maybe its purpose would be better served by a more general 
provision requiring no more than that a contract be proved, at least in part, by 
facts, other than the oral testimony of the parties, that reasonably tend to 
support its existence.9 
Take another case decided this year, McClure v. Duggan. 10 During negotia-
tions for the sale of a European race horse, the parties approached an insurance 
agency for the purpose of determining whether the horse could be insured. In 
connection with this inquiry the agency prepared two documents: (i) an applica-
tion for insurance and (ii) an order for livestock insurance. When the buyer 
sued for nondelivery, the seller moved for summary judgment. The district court 
3. Under U.C.C. § 2-201(1), the writing must be "signed by the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought or by his authorized agent or broker." 
4. 249 Cal. Rptr. at 81S, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 6S7. 
S. Not all courts have so misread subsection (2). See, e.g., Mel-Tex Valve, Inc. v. Rio Supply 
Co., 710 S.W.2d 184, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) SS (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (unsigned 
confirmatory memorandum cannot satisfy the exception). 
6. See U.C.C. § 1-201(39) ("'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with 
present intention to authenticate a writing."). 
7. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(aHc). Each exception "is a kind of special indicator that a contract, 
albeit oral, was in fact made." J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code § 2-S, at 83 (3d ed. 1988). 
8. See generally Bruckel, The Weed and the Web: Section 2-201's Corruption of the U.C.C.'s 
Substantive Provisions-The Quantity Problem, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 811. 
9. This concept "could be described as a 'finger pointing' rule where the objective conduct, as 
distinct from oral testimony as to conversations, demonstrates the existence of a contract with a 
particular subject matter." Leary & Frisch, Is Revision Due for Article 2?, 31 Viii. L. Rev. 399, 
462 (1986). 
10. 674 F. Supp. 211, S U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 925 (N.D. Tex. 1987). 
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correctly held that neither individually nor collectively were the forms sufficient 
to satisfy the written memorandum and signature requirements of section 
2-201. 11 As the court saw it, even if the forms had been signed by the seller they 
were, at best, nothing more than evidence of "mere" negotiations for the sale of 
the horse. 12 
The requisites of section 2-201 aside, it is clear that an insurance application 
is markedly different in terms of evidentiary persuasiveness from the establish-
ment of a letter of credit. Insurance protection is often acquired in anticipation 
of a contract, whereas the acquisition of a credit is always an act in performance 
of a contract. One would expect that a statute of frauds, however written, would 
capture this difference. 
In those instances where a party cannot overcome the evidentiary barrier of 
section 2-201, there is still a glimmer of hope where it has been held that the 
equitable principle of promissory estoppel is an exception to the statute. 13 In 
Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 14 a California appellate court held 
for the first time that U.C.C. sections 1-10315 and 1-20316 support such an 
exception. The court repeatedly cautioned that its decision was not to be read as 
11. The Livestock Insurance form did contain the seller's name, but it was placed there by the 
insurance agent. The court thought it "preposterous to contend that an independent insurance 
agent, acting on behalf of both parties to obtain insurance, could bind one of those parties to a 
contract for the sale of a $600,000 thoroughbred race horse." Id. at 217, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 931. If the court meant what it said, it failed to grasp the significance of what it 
means to satisfy the statute. Neither party is bound to a contract unless there is sufficient proof that 
one in fact exists. Being able to satisfy the statute does no more than open the door to such proof. 
The court further stated that the agent's authority was limited to seeking and obtaining insurance. 
But-for the purpose of the signature requirement of § 2-201-in what manner is this authority 
more restricted than that of a bank which issues a letter of credit? 
12. The court relied heavily on Oakley v. Little, 49 N.C. App. 650, 272 S.E.2d 370, 30 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 675 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the purchase of term life insurance 
showed only that the parties were progressing toward an agreement, not that a final agreement had 
been reached). 
13. Compare Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Virginia Metal Indus., 708 F.2d 930, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 384 (4th Cir. 1983) (promissory estoppel permitted as exception to statute of 
frauds) and R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus., 606 F.2d 182, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 345 (7th Cir. 1979) (same) and Warden & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 
N.W.2d 339, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 963 (Iowa 1979) (same) with C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. 
Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 26 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(promissory estoppel not permitted as exception to statute of frauds) and McDabco, Inc. v. Chet 
Adams Co., 548 F. Supp., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) I tot, 456 (D.S.C. 1982) (same) and 
Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 96 Wash. 2d 291, 635 P.2d 103, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 705 (1981) (same). 
14. 249 Cal. Rptr. 872, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1059 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
15. U.C.C. § 1-103 provides: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, 
including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, 
estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or 
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. 
16. U.C.C. § 1-203 states: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good 
faith in its performance or enforcement." 
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a nullification of section 2-201. Not only must there be a change of position in 
reliance on the oral contract, but also the aggrieved party must suffer "uncon-
scionable injury" 17 if enforcement of the contract is denied. 
Finally, in Dairyland Financial Corp. v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of 
St. Paul, 18 the Seventh Circuit was faced with the application of the statute of 
frauds provision of U.C.C. section 1-206 to the purported sale of a loan 
portfolio. The court ruled that although not specifically codified as an exception, 
the part performance doctrine survives and supplements the section. Unfortu-
nately for the plaintiff, the doctrine was inapplicable on the facts presented. 
Parol Evidence 
In Tigg Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 19 the Third Circuit, applying Michi-
gan law, considered the extent to which section 2-202 permits the admission of 
extrinsic evidence to interpret a written contract. In that case the seller (Tigg) 
and the buyer (Dow) entered into a joint effort to develop a system for filtering 
PCBs from transformer cooling liquids. They signed two contracts prepared by 
the buyer which required the buyer to purchase from the seller specified 
minimum yearly quantities of two components for the filtration system. The 
contracts also provided that the parties would meet annually, if necessary, to 
adjust the specified minimum quantities. The buyer failed to purchase the 
specified annual minimum quantities for two years, and so the seller sued. In its 
defense, the buyer contended that the contracts were only requirements con-
tracts and that it had no obligation to purchase the stated minimum quantities. 
In support of this, the buyer proffered extrinsic evidence including letters 
exchanged by the parties during negotiations which could be interpreted as 
supporting the buyer's contention. The district court refused to consider this 
extrinsic evidence. It considered the contracts to be facially unambiguous about 
the minimum quantities and so treated the buyer's extrinsic evidence as inad-
missible under section 2-202. Consequently, the district court granted partial 
summary judgment for the seller. 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial. The 
court reasoned that the contracts had first to be interpreted. Only then could it 
be known what extrinsic evidence contradicted the contracts and therefore was 
to be excluded by section 2-202. It then established a two-step process of 
interpretation. First, the court decides if the contract was ambiguous, that is, 
whether it was susceptible of more than one meaning. In making this decision, 
the court considers all proffered extrinsic evidence. Second, if it concludes that 
the contract is ambiguous, then the court submits to the fact finder the question 
of which meaning the parties intended. On this point the fact finder considers all 
17. "Unconscionable injury results from denying enforcement of a contract after one party is 
induced by another party to seriously change position relying upon the oral agreement. It also occurs 
in cases of unjust enrichment." 249 Cal. Rptr. at 878, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1071. 
18. 852 F.2d 242, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 622 (7th Cir. 1988). 
19. 822 F.2d 358, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 44 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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relevant extrinsic evidence.20 Applying this test, the Third Circuit concluded 
that the contract could support the buyer's interpretation and so the proffered 
extrinsic evidence should have been considered by the fact finder. Consequently, 
it reversed the grant of summary judgment. 
Battle of the Forms 
This year there was a spate of cases in which one party signed the other's 
form. In one case the signing party avoided summary judgment by raising a 
factual question about the signing agent's authority to agree to terms different 
from those on the signing party's own form. 21 
In Southeastern Adhesives Co. v. Funder of America, Inc., 22 the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals did not impose boilerplate terms in the signed form 
upon the signing party. In that case the buyer had purchased urea resin from 
the seller for some ten years. In each of the four transactions in suit the parties 
followed the same procedure: The buyer ordered resin by telephone. Shortly 
after, the seller shipped the resin accompanied by a bill of lading. The buyer 
signed the bill of lading to acknowledge receipt of the resin. The back of the bill 
of lading bore disclaimers of the merchantability and fitness for particular 
purpose warranties. Later the buyer would send a written purchase order and 
the seller would invoice the buyer. 
In each transaction the buyer refused to pay, claiming the resin was defective. 
The seller sued for the purchase price and the buyer counterclaimed for breach 
of warranties. On the seller's motion for summary judgment, the trial court gave 
judgment for the seller on both the warranty counterclaim and main claim for 
the price. On appeal, the court determined that the seller had not disclaimed the 
implied warranty of merchantability and that whether this warranty had been 
breached was a question of fact. The appeals court reversed that portion of the 
judgment and remanded for trial. 
The seller argued on appeal that the buyer had agreed to a disclaimer of the 
merchantability warranty when it signed the bill of lading bearing that dis-
claimer. The court, however, disagreed. It found that the contract had been 
formed earlier, when the buyer telephoned in its order. It then viewed the 
disclaimer as a proposal for an additional term under section 2-207(2) which 
did not become part of the contract because it materially altered it. Presumably 
the court was unwilling to enforce the disclaimer because it had not been 
explicitly negotiated by the seller. The court may also have been influenced by 
20. The court would exclude from the fact finder's consideration extrinsic evidence that is 
inconsistent with the express language of the contract, Id. at 363, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 52 (on the theory that evidence interpreting the contract is admissible under§ 2-202 
if it explains or supplements the contract language but not if it contradicts that language). 
21. See Ocor Prods. Corp. v. Walt Disney Prods., 682 F. Supp. 90, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 675 (D.N.H. 1988). 
22. 89 N.C. App. 438, 366 S.E.2d 505, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 403 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1988). 
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the fact that the document signed, a bill of lading, ordinarily is signed merely to 
acknowledge receipt of goods, not to assent to terms of the contract of sale. 
In a case involving similar facts, International Tin Council v. Amalgamet 
/nc.,23 a New York trial court bound the signing party to a boilerplate arbitra-
tion clause contained on the reverse side of the signed form. There the parties 
had done business with each other for some three years and thirty-eight 
transactions. Each transaction followed a similar procedure: The parties would 
agree by telephone to terms for the sale of tin to the buyer (International Tin 
Council) by the seller (Amalgamet); the seller would then confirm the agree-
ment by telex and also send its signed confirmation for the buyer to sign and 
return. The reverse side of the confirmation contained an arbitration clause. 
Habitually the buyer would sign the front of the confirmation and return the 
confirmation. When the market price of tin collapsed, the buyer refused to 
honor three sales. Subsequently, the buyer petitioned the court to stay arbitra-
tion. The court decided that the buyer was bound to the arbitration clause 
because it had signed the confirmation.24 
In Tri-State Petroleum Corp. v. Saber Energy, Inc., 25 the Fifth Circuit, 
applying Texas law, held that one who adds a term to a proposed contract and 
then signs the contract assents to the contract without the added term. In that 
case the buyer (Tri-State Petroleum) needed to obtain a gasoline source for a 
specific cancellable resale contract. According to industry custom, it arranged 
with a broker to locate a source. The broker negotiated the terms of a six-month 
gas supply agreement with a refinery (Saber Energy). The refinery prepared a 
draft of a formal contract which it signed and sent to the broker who forwarded 
it to the buyer. The draft provided: "Except as otherwise provided on the face 
hereof, buyer may not cancel this agreement under any circumstances without 
[the refinery's] written consent." The buyer typed a cancellation clause on the 
draft's first page, signed it, and returned the draft to the broker along with a 
cover letter explaining that the cancellation clause had been added. The broker 
forwarded the draft but not the cover letter to the refinery who retained it 
without objection. After the first gasoline delivery, the buyer's purchaser can-
celled the resale contract with the buyer, and the buyer sought to do the same 
with the refinery contract. The refinery objected and set off its claim for breach 
against money which the refinery owed the buyer on an unrelated contract. 
When the buyer sued on the unrelated contract, the refinery filed a counterclaim 
23. 138 Misc. 2d 383, 524 N.Y.S.2d 971, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 330 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1988). 
24. The buyer did not sign the confirmation for the last transaction apparently because the 
market price had already fallen. The court held that, given the buyer's past course of conduct in 
signing the confirmations, its retention of the last confirmation without objection constituted a tacit 
acceptance of the arbitration clause contained in it. Generally, retention of a form without objection 
does not constitute acceptance of that form's terms. 3 R. Deusenberg & L. King, Bender's Uniform 
Commercial Code Service-Sales & Bulk Transfers § 3.06[1] (1988). Where however, a past 
course of conduct indicates that a term is acceptable, silence can constitute assent to that term. Cf 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 69(1)(c) (1981). 
25. 845 F.2d 575, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 368 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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for damages for breach of the gasoline contract. A magistrate tried the counter-
claim and held that the cancellation clause did not become part of the contract. 
The magistrate reasoned that the refinery had made an offer by sending the 
draft and that the buyer had accepted that offer by signing the contract. The 
magistrate treated the cancellation clause as an "additional or different term" 
under section 2-207 which did not become part of the contract. Thus when the 
buyer purported to cancel the contract it was in breach. The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed this result. 
One may question whether this case properly has anything to do with section 
2-207. That section is intended to cover two situations: (i) the written confirma-
tion of a prior agreement and (ii) offer and acceptance involving either an 
acceptance containing minor additional terms or an exchange of forms contain-
ing differing boilerplate. 26 The contract in question apparently was not a form 
but a draft contract. Additionally, the so-called "acceptance" contained a major 
different term, the cancellation clause, and conventional section 2-207 wisdom 
suggests that a response such as the one in this case which varies an important 
dickered term cannot be an acceptance under section 2-207(1). 27 Perhaps a 
better basis for the decision would have been that, to a reasonable person, the 
buyer's response manifested assent to the unamended draft. Even though the 
buyer added the cancellation clause before it signed, its agent, the broker, failed 
to call the refinery's attention to that addition. Therefore the refinery was 
reasonable in assuming that the buyer had accepted its offer of a non-cancellable 
contract. 
The Rota Lith doctrine28 is still alive and well in the First Circuit. In Alloy 
Computer Products v. Northern Telecom, lnc.,29 the United States District 
Court for Massachusetts, applying Massachusetts law, declared that the Rota 
Lith case, though criticized by both academics and judges, was still good law, at 
least within Massachusetts. In Alloy Computer Products, the parties entered 
into a series of contracts for computer tape drives. In each negotiation they 
followed the same procedure: The buyer sent a purchase order for tape drives; 
the seller responded by shipping the goods and sending a letter containing its 
"General Terms and Conditions of Sale." The terms and conditions included a 
clause giving an express warranty, the remedy for which expressly was limited 
to repair or replacement of defective goods; the clause also disclaimed all other 
warranties. The buyer accepted and used the tape drives. Subsequently, the 
buyer sued the seller for, inter alia, breach of warranty, claiming that the seller 
had represented to the buyer that it would deliver drives with long-lasting 
ceramic coated magnetic heads but that the seller had delivered shorter-lived 
non-ceramic heads. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the buyer's 
26. U.C.C. § 2-207 Official Comment 1. 
27. See J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 47 n.71 (3d ed. 1988), and cases 
cited therein. 
28. See Roto Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
73(1stCir.1962). 
29. 683 F. Supp. 12, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1302 (D. Mass. 1988). 
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warranty claims. The court held that the seller's warranty limitation clause was 
part of the contracts between the parties and granted summary judgment for the 
seller. Following Rota Lith, the court held (i) that the seller's letter enclosing its 
"General Terms and Conditions of Sale" was a counteroffer because it materi-
ally altered the buyer's purchase order terms, and (ii) that the buyer accepted 
the seller's warranty limitation clause in the counteroffer when it accepted the 
tape drives. 30 
Output and Requirements Contracts 
Suppose a buyer who previously had no requirements for certain goods 
contemplates making a change in its business that will cause it to need those 
goods. It then signs a requirements contract for the goods. Can the buyer then 
decide not to make the business change and not be liable on the requirements 
contract? 
In Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co.,31 the Seventh Circuit, 
applying Illinois law, said that the buyer could not avoid liability. In that case a 
propane retailer (Empire Gas) contracted with a bakery (American Bakeries) to 
sell to the bakery conversion units so that the bakery could convert its fleet of 
gasoline delivery trucks to propane burning vehicles. The retailer also agreed to 
supply the bakery with propane fuel at competitive market prices for four years. 
The contract was a requirements contract calling for the retailer to furnish 
"approximately three thousand (3,000) [conversion] units, more or Jess depend-
ing upon requirements of Buyer."32 Within days of signing the contract, the 
bakery decided not to convert its vehicles to propane and thus purchased none of 
the conversion units nor any propane fuel. The bakery gave no reason for this 
decision.33 The retailer sued for breach of contract to recover its lost profits. A 
jury found the bakery to be in breach and awarded $3.25 million to the retailer. 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding of liability.34 The bakery had argued 
that the judge had improperly instructed the jury on the question of whether the 
30. The buyer had stated in an affidavit that it had "Specifically objected to [the seller's 'General 
Terms and Conditions of Sale'] on several occasions in conversations with [the seller's] sales and 
marketing representatives." The court held this statement to be too vague to raise a material 
question of fact, because the affidavit did not state what terms were objected to or whether the 
objections occurred during any of the sales in suit. 683 F. Supp. at 13 n.2, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 1303 n.2. 
31. 840 F.2d 1333, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 545 (7th Cir. 1988). 
32. The court of appeals noted that the contract language, "more or less depending upon 
requirements of Buyer," had been appended to the 3,000-unit figure just in case that estimate was 
off. The intent was that the bakery could take slightly more or slightly fewer units depending upon 
its actual needs, and not that the bakery could choose to take none at all. 840 F.2d at 1336, 5 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 549. 
33. The court of appeals speculated that the bakery's reason for not taking any conversion units 
may have been a decision by the bakery's new managers to spend the money budgeted for propane 
conversion on other projects. 840 F.2d at 1339-41, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 553-56. 
34. The court also affirmed the damage award, except for the award of prejudgment interest, 
which it reversed. 840 F.2d at 1342, 5 U.C.C Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 556-57. 
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bakery could choose to have no requirements under the contract.35 Over the 
bakery's objection, the trial judge had read subsection 2-306( 1 )36 to the jury 
without explanation. The court held this to be error, but harmless error. In 
effect, the court reasoned that, once the retailer had introduced significant 
evidence of bad faith by the bakery, the burden of production shifted to the 
bakery to introduce contrary evidence. By refusing to give any reason for its 
decision not to convert, the bakery failed to carry that burden and thus should 
have had a directed verdict entered against it. Since it should not have gotten to 
the jury in the first place, the error in the jury instructions was harmless. 
The error in the jury instructions, according to the Seventh Circuit, was to 
read the "unreasonably disproportionate" proviso of subsection 2-306( 1) to the 
jury.37 The court held that, where a buyer declares his requirements to be much 
less than a stated estimate, that proviso does not apply.38 In that situation the 
"good faith" test of the first part of subsection 2-306(1) is the only test to be 
applied.39 The court based its conclusion on case law and law review articles as 
well as the wording of the proviso and the Official Comments to the section. The 
court then proceeded to discuss the "good faith" test as it applied to a decrease 
in requirements. Clearly, said the court, it would be bad faith for the bakery to 
reduce its requirements so that it could take advantage of cheaper substitutes, or 
so that it could injure the retailer because they were competitors in another 
market. Conversely, continued the court, it would not be bad faith for the 
bakery to reduce its requirements for business reasons unrelated to the contract 
or its relationship with the retailer, such as a decline in the demand for bakery 
products that led it to reduce or abandon its fleet of trucks. Yet here the bakery 
offered no reason for its decision not to convert. For all that appeared, the 
bakery had simply changed its mind about converting. The court held that this 
was not sufficient to satisfy the good faith test. To hold otherwise, said the court, 
would be to treat the requirements contract as an option contract and this 
treatment would be inconsistent with both Illinois case law and the Code's 
coverage of option contracts in a section separate from the requirements contract 
35. The bakery also asserted that it was entitled to a directed verdict because the retailer could 
not furnish conforming conversion units. This argument was based upon the premise that a certain 
Dutch-made conversion unit (Be & Be) had been the basis of the parties' negotiations and therefore 
were the goods to be furnished under the contract. It further argued that this unit had not worked 
successfully so that it was not possible for the retailer to supply the agreed upon conversion unit. 
The court found that the contract was not for the Be & Be conversion unit but for any conversion 
unit that would do the job. Consequently, the court rejected this ground for appeal. 
36. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) provides: 
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the requirements of the 
buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith, except that no 
quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated 
estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered 
or demanded. 
37. See supra note 36. 
38. 840 F.2d at 1339, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 553. 
39. Id. The proviso thus applies only where a party seeks to increase his requirements or output. 
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section.40 Thus a buyer cannot decide to change its business so as to create a 
need for certain goods, then enter into a requirements contract for those goods 
and subsequently decide not to change its business and so avoid liability on the 
requirements contract. 
WARRANTIES 
General 
In Kirby Forest Industries v. Dobbs,41 the Texas Court of Appeals, in 
dictum,42 discussed the implied warranty of title under section 2-312. In that 
case four relatives owned in common four fifty-acre tracts of timberland. They 
partitioned the land, each taking title to one fifty-acre tract. Later, Pfleider 
persuaded three of the relatives to sell him their timber rights. Each relative 
executed a timber deed to Pfleider, who assigned the deeds to Kirby Forest 
Industries ("KFI"). One of the assigned deeds covered the tract owned by 
Dobbs. KFI performed a title check and hired a logger to cut the timber. 
During the logging, the fourth relative (Cook), who had not sold his timber 
rights, complained to the logger that he was logging the wrong tract. The logger 
continued to cut. In fact, KFI logged the Cook tract rather than the Dobbs tract. 
The mistake was induced by an ambiguous reference in the Dobbs timber deed 
which made it appear as if the property covered by that deed was the tract 
owned by Cook.43 Cook sued KFI for converting his timber, and KFI filed a 
third party complaint against Dobbs and others. The trial court gave judgment 
for Cook on the conversion claim and for Dobbs on KFI's third party complaint. 
On KFl's appeal from the judgment on its third party complaint, the court 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. On the implied warranty of title claim, it 
reversed the trial court and found the warranty to have been made and 
breached. The warranty claim was based upon the initial transaction between 
Dobbs and KFl's assignor Pfleider. The court held that KFI received by 
assignment Pfleider's implied warranty of title rights against Dobbs. 44 The 
court also held that this warranty was breached by the ambiguous reference in 
40. See U.C.C. § 2-311. 
41. 743 S.W.2d 348, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1321 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
42. The discussion was dictum because the court found that an indemnity clause contained in the 
relevant timber deed permitted recovery of the losses in suit. 
43. When the relatives had partitioned the common ownership, they each took a tract by 
partition deed. Instead of delineating each tract by metes and bounds description, the partition deeds 
referred back to the deeds which had conveyed the tracts to the relatives' predecessors in title. Thus 
the Dobbs partition deed referred to a volume and page for a description of the property it covered. 
However, that volume and page contained both the end of the deed to what later became the Cook 
tract, including a metes and bounds description of that property, and the beginning of the deed to 
what later became the Dobbs tract. The metes and bounds description to what later became the 
Dobbs tract was contained on the following page. This ambiguous reference in the Dobbs partition 
deed was copied into the Dobbs timber deed. Thus, the tract described in the Dobbs timber deed 
appeared to be the tract which Cook owned. 
44. The article 2 implied warranty of title applied because the subject matter of the transactions, 
timber to be cut, was "goods" under article 2. U.C.C. § 2-107(2). 
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the timber deed from Dobbs to Pfleider. Neither the title search performed by 
KFI, which had failed to detect the problem, nor the warning to the logger that 
he was on the wrong land prevented the breach of warranty from being the 
proximate cause of KFI's conversion liability. Therefore the court ruled that 
KFI could recover from Dobbs on the implied warranty of title. 
In Hicks v. Thomas,45 the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the remote 
purchaser of a truck could sue an earlier seller of the truck for breach of the 
implied warranty of title. In that case the owner of a truck (Thomas) loaned it 
to his son-in-law (Cross). The son-in-law fell behind in his house rental 
payments and abandoned the house together with the truck which was by then 
in an extreme state of disrepair. The landlord (Daniels) claimed a landlord's 
lien on the truck and traded it to Ellis who in turn sold it to Hicks. Hicks 
repaired the truck and sold it to Cooper. The original owner Thomas then sued 
Cooper to replevy the truck. Hicks refunded Cooper's money, took back the 
truck, and became the defendant. Hicks also cross-claimed against the landlord 
and Ellis for breach of warranty of title. The trial court entered summary 
judgment for the owner of the truck and dismissed Hick's warranty of title 
claim against the landlord. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the entry 
of summary judgment for the owner but reversed the dismissal of the warranty 
of title claim. The court held that, pursuant to a Mississippi statute abolishing 
privity as a requirement for certain actions including U.C.C. warranty actions, 
privity was not a requirement in an action for breach of the implied warranty of 
title. 46 
This year's express warranty cases, as usual, often contain discussions of 
when an affirmation of fact, promise, description, or sample relating to goods 
becomes part of the "basis of the bargain" under U.C.C. section 2-313. As the 
Official Comments indicate, generally affirmations of fact made by the seller 
about the goods become part of the basis of the bargain, and the burden is upon 
the seller to provide clear affirmative proof of facts which refute this. 47 The 
practical effect of this appears to be that the buyer need not allege and prove 
reliance specifically upon the affirmations. Instead, reliance is presumed and it 
is up to the seller to rebut that presumption by proving that the buyer could not 
reasonably have relied. 48 
45. 516 So. 2d 1344, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 105 (Miss. 1987). 
46. Cases in other states are split on the question of whether a remote purchaser can sue for 
breach of the implied warranty of title. For cases permitting recovery, see Mitchell v. Webb, 591 
S.W.2d 547, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979); Kirby Forest Indus., 743 
S.W.2d at 348, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1321 (discussed in text accompanying notes 
41-44, supra. But see Universal C.1.T. Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493 
S.W.2d 385, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (not permitting recovery). 
47. U.C.C. § 2-313 Official Comments 3, 8. 
48. See Uniform Revised Sales Act comment on§ 37, at 144, 147 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 
(1944)) [hereinafter Proposed Final Draft No. 1], reprinted in 2 ALI & NCCUSL, Uniform 
Commercial Code Drafts 156, 159 (1984) [hereinafter U.C.C. Drafts]. See also 2 W. Hawkland, 
Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2-313:05 ( 1984 ); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 27, at 
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Kirby Forest Industries v. Dobbs seems contrary to this presumption of 
reliance analysis. In that case, an assignee of a timber deed containing an 
express warranty of title sued, inter alia, for breach of that express warranty. In 
dictum, the Texas Court of Appeals declared the assignee could not recover on 
this theory because it had failed to introduce evidence proving that the express 
warranty in the timber deed had been part of the basis of the bargain between 
the grantor and the grantee-assignor.49 Under the analysis developed above, it 
would seem that the grantor (whom the assignee was suing) had the burden of 
proving that the grantee could not reasonably have relied upon the warranty. 
The ruling was harmless, however, because the court affirmed judgment for the 
assignee of another ground. 
A seller has several ways to rebut the presumption of reliance. First, an 
examination of the goods by the buyer before he closes the deal may establish 
that he did not rely on the seller's affirmation. 50 Second, the seller may prove 
that the affirmation is merely one of value, opinion, or commendation.51 Pre-
sumably the seller does this when he shows that both he and the buyer knew 
that the seller had no actual or apparent basis for making the affirmation. An 
example of this would be a statement about the failure rate of experimental 
goods not yet produced. 52 Third, the seller may prove that the buyer was never 
aware of the affirmation.53 In all of these instances the seller is doing no more 
than demonstrating that the buyer did not reasonably rely upon the seller's 
affirmations. 
Under U.C.C. section 2-314, courts continue to find that an implied warranty 
of merchantability can accompany a sale of used goods.54 
400. See generally Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 Cornell 
L. Rev. 30, 50-67 (1978). 
49. 743 S.W.2d 348, 355, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1321, 1326 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1987). See text accompanying notes 41-44, supra. 
50. See Proposed Final Draft No. 1, supra note 48, comment on§ 37, at 144, reprinted in 2 
U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 48, at 156. 
51. Cf id. at 147, reprinted in 2 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 48, at 159. 
52. St. Charles Cable TV, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 820, 829, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 659, 670-71(S.D.N.Y.1988) (alleged statement by seller that expected failure 
rate for experimental cable TV channel descrambler not yet produced would be less than four 
percent held not part of basis of bargain). See generally Special Project, supra note 48, at 65, 172. 
53. See Dilenno v. Libbey Glass Div., Owens-Illinois, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 373, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 706, 709 (D. Del. 1987) (court dismissed personal injury claim for breach of 
express warranty based on illustration in manufacturer's catalogue for lack of evidence that injured 
party ever saw catalogue). 
54. Fitzner Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac, Inc. v. Smith, 523 So. 2d 324, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 396 (Miss. 1988) (used automobile); Fernandes v. Union Bookbinding Co., 400 Mass. 
27, 507 N.E.2d 728, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 959 (1987) (used die press); Beck Enters., 
Inc. v. Hester, 512 So. 2d 672, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 59 (Miss. 1987) (used truck). 
The drafting history of § 2-314 demonstrates that the implied warranty of merchantability can 
attach to the sale of used goods. At one point the draft of what became article 2 provided that "all 
implied warranties are excluded by the offering of goods for sale as used goods." Uniform 
Commercial Code-Revised Uniform Sales Act§ 41(5) (3d Draft 1943). This phrase disappears in 
U.C.C. Survey: Sales 1457 
In Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Association,55 the Washington 
Supreme Court, apparently in dictum,56 indicated that an auctioneer known by 
a purchaser to be selling the goods of others makes an implied warranty of 
merchantability to that purchaser when it sells goods at auction. In that case, 
Travis purchased for $25,000 a colt owned by Northwest Farms (the owner) at 
a yearling auction conducted by Washington Horse Breeders Association (the 
auctioneer). Subsequently the purchaser's veterinarian detected a loud heart 
murmur which rendered the colt unfit for racing or breeding. The purchaser 
sued both the owner and the auctioneer for, inter alia, breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability, seeking rescission of the contract and return of the 
purchase price.57 In the course of its discussion of the implied warranty of 
merchantability, the Washington Supreme Court indicated that the auctioneer 
had made such a warranty to the purchaser.58 The court assumed throughout its 
opinion that the auctioneer was a "seller." It also found the auctioneer to be a 
"merchant" and then said the auctioneer "is held to the warranty rules set forth 
in the U.C.C.,"59 citing an Alabama case. Although the auctioneer here was 
clearly a merchant, one may question whether it was the "seller" of the colt.60 
Generally, a seller is one who has title to the goods conveyed to the buyer.61 
Here the auctioneer did not have title, and therefore, it could not have been a 
seller. Since one must be a seller to make an implied warranty of 
merchantability under U.C.C. section 2-314, the auctioneer could not be held to 
such warranty. Although that section does not foreclose the possibility of an 
implied warranty of merchantability in non-sales transactions,62 the case law 
later drafts. Official Comment 3 to§ 2-314 now explicitly assumes that the implied merchantability 
warranty can arise from the sale of used goods. 
SS. 111 Wash. 2d 396, 7S9 P.2d 418, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1093 (1988). 
S6. The court's conclusion that the auctioneer made an implied warranty of merchantability to 
the purchaser apparently was dictum because the auctioneer appears not to have disputed that such 
a warranty could be implied. Instead, it argued that any such warranty, if made, had been 
disclaimed. See 47 Wash. App. 361, 734 P.2d 9S6, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 97S (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1987), rev'd in part and remanded, 111 Wash. 2d 396, 7S9 P.2d 418, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) 1093 (1988). 
S7. The purchaser also made claims for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty 
of fitness, mutual mistake, and violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. § 19.86 (1989)). A judgment for the purchaser on all but one of these claims was twice 
affirmed on appeal, 47 Wash. App. 361, 734 P.2d 9S6, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 97S 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987); aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 111 Wash. 2d 396, 7S9 P.2d 418, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1093 ( 1988). As to the remaining claim for breach of implied warranty of 
fitness, the Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the lower court to consider the 
effectiveness of a warranty disclaimer in the auction sale catalogue. 
S8. 111 Wash. 2d at 401, 7S9 P.2d at 420-21, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1097. 
S9. Id. 
60. See U.C.C. § 2-104(1). 
61. See U.C.C. § 2-103( 1 )(d) (" 'Seller'" means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods."); 
id. § 2-106(1) ("A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price 
(Section 2-401 )");cf id. § 2-40 l ( 1) (stating "title to goods passes from the seller to the buyer ... "). 
62. See U.C.C. § 2-313 Official Comment 2 (U.C.C. warranty sections not designed to limit 
warranties to sales transactions). 
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does not support the proposition that auctioneers generally make these implied 
warranties.63 Further, the Alabama case64 relied upon by the court does not hold 
that an auctioneer makes the implied warranty of merchantability. Rather, it 
found that the owner of cattle sold at auction by a merchant auctioneer makes 
such a warranty. Moreover, unless the auctioneer is auctioning its own goods 
(and is thus a "seller") or unless it makes an express warranty on its own 
behalf, the auctioneer should generally not be held to warrant the 
merchantability of what it sells, even if it is a merchant. The reason for this is 
that the auctioneer who sells for others acts merely as an agent. Therefore, the 
auctioneer should not be personally liable on the contract of sale, including any 
warranties encompassed therein, unless it is liable under agency law.65 Under 
agency law, an agent is generally personally liable on a contract made for its 
principal only when the principal is undisclosed or partially disclosed. 66 In 
Travis, the buyer not only knew who the principal was but also obtaintd an 
express warranty from it. Thus, the auctioneer in Travis should not have been 
held liable on the implied warranty of merchantability claim. The buyer's claim 
that goods sold are not merchantable is against the owner of the goods sold, not 
the auctioneer. 67 
Several courts have decided that an ordinary use of goods cannot constitute a 
"particular purpose" in order to establish an implied warranty of fitness for 
particular purpose under U.C.C. section 2-315.68 
63. Case law is surprisingly sparse, perhaps because auctioneers are careful to disclaim implied 
warranties at time of sale. Research uncovered only one case finding that auctioneers who regularly 
sell particular goods make implied warranties of merchantability as to those goods, and that finding 
was dictum. See Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492, 10 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 300, 302 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972). In several cases the trial court granted 
judgment for the auctioneer on an implied merchantability warranty claim, and that judgment was 
not appealed. Vince v. Broome, 443 So. 2d 23, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1498 (Miss. 
1983); Bemidji Sales Barn, Inc. v. Chatfield, 312 Minn. 11, 250 N.W.2d 185, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1137 ( 1977). 
64. Bradford v. Northwest Ala. Livestock Ass'n, 379 So. 2d 609, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1009 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980). 
65. Cf U.C.C. § 1-103 (Code supplemented by law of principal and agent, unless displaced by 
particular provisions of Code). 
66. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 321 illustration 5 (1958) (agent for partially disclosed 
principal is a party to contract). The agency theory described in the text was adopted by at least two 
pre-Code cases: Barrett v. Rumeliote, 256 Iowa 1, 126 N.W.2d 322 (1964); Goltz v. Humboldt 
Livestock Auction Inc., 255 Iowa 1384, 125 N.W.2d 773 (1964); see also 3 R. Anderson, Uniform 
Commercial Code§§ 2-314:136, :137 (3d ed. 1983). 
67. Even where the owner is not itself a merchant and therefore would not normally make the 
implied merchantability warranty, at least one court has found that the owner's employment of an 
auctioneer who is also a merchant causes the owner to make the implied merchantability warranty 
to the purchaser. Bradford, 379 So. 2d at 611, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1013. 
68. Duford v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 833 F.2d 407, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1374 
(1st Cir. 1987) (applying New Hampshire law); Fernandes v. Union Bookbinding Co., 400 Mass. 
27, 507 N.E.2d 728, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 959 (1987); cf Dilenno v. Libbey Glass 
Division, Owens-Illinois, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 373, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 706, 710 (D. 
Del. 1987). There is a split of authority on whether an ordinary use of goods can constitute a 
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Virtually everyone knows that "as is" disclaimers are an effective way of 
excluding the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular 
purpose.69 The "as is" disclaimer is effective "unless the circumstances indicate 
otherwise."70 Jn several instances courts may tend to find that the circumstances 
indicate otherwise: (i) The "as is" disclaimer is not conspicuous;71 (ii) the 
phrase "as is" is not commonly known by persons in the buyer's position (e.g., a 
consumer) to exclude warranties;72 (iii) other terms of the contract and sur-
rounding circumstances such as prior course of dealing indicate that the parties 
did not intend the "as is" phrase to exclude all warranties.73 How much leeway 
the courts will permit a buyer to overcome an "as is" clause by proving that 
circumstances indicate otherwise depends upon the facts of each case. Thus, for 
example, in Nick Mikalacki Construction Co. v. M.j.L. Truck Sales, 74 where 
the buyer (Mikalacki) clearly was aware of the clause and its effect, an Ohio 
appellate court accorded no leeway. In that case, the buyer purchased a used 
dump truck which had been advertised as having a rebuilt engine. The contract 
contained an "as is" disclaimer which had been separately acknowledged by the 
"particular purpose" under U.C.C. § 2-315. For cases see B. Clark & C. Smith, The Law of 
Product Warranties § 6.02[2] nn.26, 27 ( 1984 & Supp. 1988). 
69. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) provides: 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by 
expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other language which in common understand-
ing calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is 
no implied warranty .... 
70. Id. The drafting history shows that the "unless circumstances indicate otherwise" phrase 
was added for clarification and to meet criticism by the New York Law Revision Commission. See 
ALI & NCCUSL, 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial 
Code 39-40, reprinted in 18 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 48, at 63-64 (1984). The commission's 
criticism was that the subsection as then written "could be read as meaning that the quoted phrases 
are terms of art that necessarily exclude all implied warranties, without regard to actual under-
standing in the trade." N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n, Report and Appendices Relating to the 
U.C.C. 377 (1956); see also 1 N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n, 1955 Report 409 (1955). The 
commission recommended that the phrase "is generally understood by buyers of such commodities to 
exclude implied warranties" be added to meet its criticism. The Enlarged Editorial Board's 
Subcommittee on Article 2 rejected this recommendation for the reason that it "would cast 
unnecessary doubt on well-understood meanings." See Comment on Criticisms of Article 2 Uniform 
Commercial Code (Report No. 4 of the Subcommittee on Article 2) 50-51 (1955). The subcommit-
tee ofTered the "circumstances indicate otherwise" language because "the Code may well be subject 
to the unintended interpretation that the phrases quoted [in the subsection] always and necessarily 
exclude all implied warranties." Id. at 50. 
71. Fernandez v. Western Railroad Builders, 122 Idaho 907, 736 P.2d 1361, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 347 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987). See also 3 R. Anderson, supra note 66, § 2-316:72; 
J. White & R. Summers, supra note 27, at 507-08. "Conspicuous" is defined in U.C.C. 
§ 1-201(10). 
72. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 27, at 505-06. This is supported by the subsection's 
drafting history, see supra note 70. But see cases cited in J. White & R. Summers, supra note 27, at 
506 n.7. 
73. Cindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345, 7 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970). 
74. 33 Ohio App. 3d 228, 515 N.E.2d 24, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 69 (1986). 
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buyer. 75 Shortly after the sale, the truck developed engine trouble. The buyer 
sued for breach of express and implied warranties, and the seller moved for 
summary judgment. 
The trial court granted the motion. On appeal the buyer argued that since it 
had understood the clause "as is" to mean that it was accepting only the defects 
in the vehicle of which it had actual knowledge, it had put in issue the 
effectiveness of the disclaimer as to latent defects. The court rejected this 
argument and affirmed the summary judgment for the seller. It reasoned that 
the buyer had not brought itself within any previously recognized instances of 
circumstances inconsistent with the "as is" disclaimer. The court further indi-
cated that the interpretation of the "as is" clause in this contract was clear and 
unambiguous and was therefore a question of law for the court to resolve. One 
judge, however, dissented. He saw the seller's representation that the truck's 
engine had been rebuilt as a circumstance inconsistent with the "as is" dis-
claimer. In his view, a buyer in these circumstances would not have any reason 
to know that it was waiving warranties covering the engine. 
U.C.C. section 2-318 concerns who may sue for breach of warranty, express 
or implied.76 It is based on the theory that certain classes of persons described in 
the section who suffer certain kinds of described injuries are third party 
beneficiaries of express and implied warranties given by seller to buyer. Official 
Comment 1 to that section indicates that the seller remains free to both exclude 
or disclaim warranties under section 2-316 and to limit the remedies for breach 
of those warranties under sections 2-718 or 2-719. This is consistent with the 
third party beneficiary theory reflected in section 2-319. The third party 
beneficiary's rights arise because the parties to the underlying contract have 
intended to create those rights. 77 Thus, the beneficiary's rights derive from the 
underlying contract, and consequently, if there is a warranty disclaimer or 
remedy limitation, or if the circumstances exclude warranties in the underlying 
contract, the third party's rights are similarly restricted. 78 Despite this, authority 
is split on whether a disclaimer or remedy limitation effective against the buyer 
is effective against the third party beneficiary under section 2-318. 79 
75. The relevant contract language was: "Sold 'As Is' I hereby make this purchase and accept 
this Used Truck knowingly without any warranty whatsoever, express or implied by our Co. or its 
agents." 33 Ohio App. 3d at 228, 515 N.E.2d at 25, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 70. 
76. The 1987 Official Text version of U.C.C. § 2-318 contains three alternative drafts of that 
section. For a brief discussion of why alternative drafts were recommended, see Report No. 3 of the 
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code 13-14 (1967). 
77. Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 14 introductory note, at 439 (1981); id. § 304 
comment b, at 448. 
78. 3 R. Anderson, supra note 66, § 2:318.9, at 406-07. 
79. The case law is collected and briefly described in Patty Precision Prods. Co. v. Brown & 
Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1257, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 692, 707-08 (10th Cir. 
1988) (Logan, J., concurring). 
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PERFORMANCE 
Title, Creditors, and Good Faith Purchasers 
Several interesting cases on the application of the entrustment provision of 
U.C.C. section 2-403 were reported this year. First, consider Canterra Petro-
leum, Inc. v. Western Drilling & Mining Supply. 80 Oil field pipe originally 
owned by Mitchell Energy Corporation ("Mitchell") was entrusted to Port 
Pipe Terminal, Inc. ("Port Pipe") for storage. The culprits in this story, two 
high-ranking employees of Port Pipe, fraudulently transferred apparent owner-
ship of the pipe to Pharoah, Inc. ("Pharoah"), a sham corporation created by 
the employees to fraudulently dispose of goods stored with Port Pipe. Pharoah 
sold the pipe to Nickel Supply Company, Inc. ("Nickel"), which sold it to 
Yamin Oil Supply ("Yamin"), which sold it to NorthStar Equipment Corpora-
tion ("NorthStar"), which sold it to Western Drilling & Mining Supply 
("Western"), which sold it to Canterra Petroleum, Inc. ("Canterra"). All of 
these transactions were paper transactions only. The pipe did not leave Port 
Pipe's storage facility until delivered to a trucking firm by Canterra. When 
Canterra learned what had happened, it returned the pipe to Mitchell. This 
multi-party litigation ensued. Canterra sued Western for breach of warranty of 
title. Western commenced a third-party action against NorthStar for breach of 
warranty of title, and NorthStar commenced a fourth-party action against 
Yamin. The trial court granted each complaining party's motion for summary 
judgment. 
On an appeal by NorthStar, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed. The 
court had to contend with NorthStar's argument that, as a consequence of 
U.C.C. section 2-403(2),81 Nickel received good title to the pipe as did everyone 
thereafter.82 The trial court had decided, on the basis of affidavits, that the 
entrustment provision was inapplicable because, as a matter of law, Port Pipe 
was not a "merchant who deals in goods of that kind."83 The state supreme 
court held that the determinative standard was whether Port Pipe "engaged 
regularly in selling goods of the kind"84 and that conclusory affidavits of the type 
presented were not dispositive of the issue, especially where, as here, they 
contained an admission that "Port Pipe did sell small quantities of pipe from 
time to time, to clear odd lots, or to sell that pipe remaining after a substantial 
portion of a lot was sold."85 Summary judgment was, therefore, inappropriate. 
80. 418 N.W.2d 267, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1002 (N.D. 1987). 
81. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) provides: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals 
in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary 
course of business." 
82. Once one party in the chain of sale receives good title, the "shelter" principle in U.C.C. § 
2-403( 1) would insure good title to all subsequent buyers. 
83. Notice that one who may be a merchant for other purposes under the Code, see U.C.C. 
§ 2-104(1), is not necessarily a merchant with the power to transfer the title of the entruster under 
u.c.c. § 2-403(2). 
84. 418 N.W.2d at 271, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1005. 
85. Id. 
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It would seem, however, that even if the requisite merchant status can be 
shown, to prevail, NorthStar should also be required to show that Mitchell 
knew of that status at the time of the entrustment.86 
The second and more interesting aspect of the case was the fact that the pipe 
had been sold not by the entrustee, Port Pipe, but by the dummy corporation, 
Pharoah. Relying on the policy of U.C.C. section 2-403(2) rather than its 
terms,87 the court could see no reason for not extending its umbrella of protec-
tion where the guilty were not outside parties but were the entrustee's employ-
ees. 
Lest one forget that section 2-403(2) will not always empower the merchant 
to transfer clear title to a buyer in ordinary courts, Barth v. Protetch88 serves as 
a convenient reminder. Where plaintiffs were joint owners of a painting with an 
understanding that it would not be sold except upon mutual consent, its 
entrustment by one did not give the merchant the power to transfer the title of 
the other.89 The opinion does not mention just what rights the plaintiffs have 
against the ultimate purchaser. Presumably, the merchant did have the power to 
transfer the entruster's one-half interest in the painting. This would suggest 
that the entruster has no claim and that the non-entruster has simply a new co-
owner. 
With the proliferation of commercial statutes external to the Code comes the 
increasingly frequent task of either harmonizing the two sources of law or, if the 
two are irreconcilable, deciding which is preemptive of the other. In Dugdale of 
Nebraska, Inc. v. First State Bank,90 the Nebraska Supreme Court thought 
harmonization the better alternative. The buyer had purchased and taken 
possession of a new car but had never received from the dealer the manufac-
turer's certificate of origin. The reason for the dealer's dereliction was that it 
had previously delivered the certificate to the bank pursuant to the terms of a 
loan and security agreement covering the car. When the dealer defaulted, the 
bank claimed the car. The trial court, relying on Nebraska's certificate of title 
statute,91 held that the bank and not the buyer had title. 
86. See, e.g., Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 168, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400, 4 
U.C.C. Rep Serv. (Callaghan) 572 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967) (entruster must have knowledge of 
entrustee's status). See also Leary & Sperling, The Outer Limits of Entrusting, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 50, 
83-85 (1981). 
87. The court expressed the policy of U.C.C. § 2-403(2) in the following terms: "By favoring the 
innocent third party, the Uniform Commercial Code endeavors to promote the flow of commerce by 
placing the burden of ascertaining and preventing fraudulent transactions on the one in the best 
position to prevent them, the original seller." 418 N.W.2d at 273, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 1009 (citing 3 R. Anderson, supra note 66, § 2-403:4 (quoting Sacks v. State, 172 
Ind. App. 185, 360 N.E.2d 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977))). 
88. 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
89. The court also noted that the non-entruster was not estopped from asserting her rights in the 
painting since she never authorized her co-owner or any other third party to transfer her interest. 
Id. at 1353-54. 
90. 227 Neb. 729, 420 N.W.2d 273, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 111 (1988). 
91. Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 60-105 (1984) provides in pertinent part: 
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On appeal, the state supreme court reversed. The court acknowledged a long 
line of past decisions holding that the certificate of title is the exclusive means of 
transferring ownership, but it distinguished this case on the ground that the 
dispute was between a purchaser and a dealer's financier. Why this difference 
matters is unclear. The court placed great reliance on the dealer's warranty of 
title under U.C.C. section 2-312 and assumed that under section 2-403 the 
warranty was binding on the bank. But the dealer's warranty in no way affects 
the buyer's title. Whether a warranty is given or disclaimed is relevant only to 
the seller's responsibility if, under the controlling law, the title transferred turns 
out to be defective. Next, the court was struck by what it perceived to be an 
absurd result of reading the title statute as preemptive of section 2-403. If the 
buyer obtained no interest because it did not receive the necessary title papers, 
the bank too obtained no interest because it never possessed the car. What the 
court overlooked was that the bank's interest was a security interest which was 
no doubt obtainable without possession. For this reason also, the relevant Code 
section would appear to be section 9-307( 1 ),92 not section 2-403(2). 
One more word from the Nebraska Supreme Court. In Worley v. Schaefer,93 
a tort case involving an issue of insurance coverage, the court held that where 
the title statute and the Code conflict on the passage of title, the Code controls, 
at least for purposes of tort law and liability insurance coverage. 
Certificate of title legislation, because of its pervasiveness, produces most, but 
by no means all, of the cases in this area. In In re Wegner,94 the Ninth Circuit 
held that to the extent Montana law required a bill of sale to transfer title to 
livestock, the state law superseded the Code. On the other hand, in In re Gull 
Air, Jnc.,95 a bankruptcy court held that compliance with the Federal Aviation 
Act of 1958 was not a prerequisite to the passage of title to an aircraft. The 
prescription that the instrument of conveyance must be recorded with the 
Federal Aviation Administration is for the protection of innocent third parties 
only. 
Tender, Cure, and Notice 
The Code clearly bestows upon a seller the limited right to cure a defective 
tender after rejection by the buyer.96 This year the Mississippi Supreme Court 
considered whether a seller has a right to cure following a revocation of 
No person ... acquiring a motor vehicle ... shall acquire any right, title, claim, or interest 
in or to such motor vehicle ... until he shall have had delivered to him physical possession of 
such motor vehicle ... and a certificate of title or a manufacturer's or importer's certificate .... 
No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any 
person in or to any motor vehicle ... unless there is compliance with this section. 
92. See U.C.C. § 9-307( 1) ("A buyer in ordinary course of business ... takes free of a security 
interest created by his seller .... "). 
93. 228 Neb. 484, 423 N.W.2d 748, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 710 (1988). 
94. 839 F.2d 533, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 996 (9th Cir. 1988). 
95. 73 Bankr. 820, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 466 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). 
96. See U.C.C. §§ 2-508, 2-612(2). 
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acceptance. The issue is not novel. Numerous courts in the past have confronted 
it and have generally agreed that in most circumstances the right to cure is lost 
once acceptance has occurred.97 The Mississippi court decided otherwise in 
Fitzner Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac, Inc. v. Smith,98 holding that the buyer of an 
automobile that had been plagued with infirmities since its purchase could not 
revoke unless the seller was first afforded an opportunity to cure. 
Undaunted by the reality that neither the language of the Code nor the 
weight of authority sanction this extension of the right to cure, the court 
reasoned that its holding was justified by the general policy of the law favoring 
the prevention of economic waste. This policy, said the court, "strongly supports 
recognition of a reasonable right to cure."99 In an attempt at further justifica-
tion, the court added that nothing in section 2-608100 commands a contrary 
conclusion. Although it is technically true that section 2-608 does not directly 
address the applicability of the seller's cure to a revocation situation, the court 
seems to neglect the importance of the language of section 2-508 in this regard. 
That provision clearly limits the seller's right of cure to a rejected tender. 
Several courts this year emphasized the importance of the buyer's status in 
defining the standard of compliance necessary to satisfy the notice requirements 
of 2-607(3)(a). 101 Titan Trading, Inc. v. Roof Systems, Inc. 102 and Stamper 
Black Hills Gold jewelry, Inc. v. Souther103 demonstrate the willingness of some 
courts to follow the lead of the Code comments and hold merchant buyers to a 
heightened standard of timely and adequate notice. 104 In each case, the standard 
97. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1318 (8th Cir. 
1974); American Honda Motor Co., v. Boyd, 475 So. 2d 835, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
410 (Ala. 1985); Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 668 P.2d 65, 35 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 804 (1983); Gappelberg v. Landrum, 666 S.W.2d 88, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1563 (Tex. 1984). See also 1 J. White & R. Summers, supra note 27, at 424; Note, 
Revocation of Acceptance: The Seller's Right to Cure After Gappelberg v. Landrum, 38 Baylor L. 
Rev. 441 (1986). 
98. 523 So. 2d 324, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 396 (Miss. 1988). 
99. Id. at 328 n.1, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 401 n.1. 
100. U.C.C. § 2-608 governs the buyer's right of revocation. 
101. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) requires that as a prerequisite to pursuit of a remedy for breach, the 
buyer must "within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify 
the seller of breach." 
102. 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 591 (W.D. Ga. 1987). 
103. 414 N.W.2d 601, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 340 (N.D. 1987). 
104. With regard to timeliness of notice, the official commentary accompanying § 2-607 imposes 
upon merchant buyers a standard of commercial good faith and notes that this is a more exacting 
measure than that required of a retail consumer. However, with regard to content of the notice, the 
standard required of merchants is not explicitly addressed. Comment four generally states: "The 
content of 1he notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still 
troublesome and must be watched." But further reading of this comment reveals another, somewhat 
stricter, standard which requires that the content of the notice "be such as informs the seller that the 
transaction is claimed to involve a breach." Consistent with the policy of promo1ing commercial 
good faith in transactions between merchants, as expressed in the timeliness requirement and 
throughout the Code generally, courts have read into comment four a distinction in the applicability 
of the two content standards based on the status of the parties. 
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of adequacy was defined as one which provides notification to the seller that the 
buyer intends to treat the alleged nonconformity as a breach. Notice which does 
no more than apprise the seller that the transaction is "troublesome" is ade-
quate in the case of a consumer buyer, but it will not do for transactions 
between merchants. Accordingly, the seller's knowledge of the nonconformity 
does not relieve the merchant buyer of the obligation to give notice of his intent 
to treat the nonconformity as a breach. 105 
The holding in McClure Oil Corp. v. Murray Equipment, Inc. 106 provides a 
sharp contrast to the courts' reasoning in Titan and Souther. In McClure, the 
court held that a communication from the manufacturer of defective petroleum 
pumps to seller Murray Equipment, which informed it that buyer McClure 
was experiencing difficulties with the pumps, constituted sufficient notice under 
2-607(3 )(a). The court paid no attention whatever to the merchant status of the 
buyer. If it had thought it relevant, the mere notification of problems with the 
equipment would presumably not have constituted adequate notice. Moreover, 
the court appears to have overlooked any issues raised by the fact that the 
"notice" which the seller received was not from the buyer but was essentially 
nothing more than a status report from the manufacturer's troubleshooter. 
Arguably, the language of 2-607(3)(a) is not broad enough to encompass this 
kind of third party notice. 107 This would most certainly be true if the Titan and 
Souther courts' construction of the section is accepted as accurate. 
As a third party beneficiary of a warranty running to his employer, the 
plaintiff in Lariviere v. Dayton Safety Ladder Co. 108 represents a class of buyers 
to which yet another notice standard applies. The Official Comments accompa-
nying 2-607 relate that notice requirements must be relaxed when applied to a 
third party beneficiary. All that is necessary is that the plaintiff use "good faith 
in notifying" the seller after discovery of the breach.109 In this personal injury 
suit, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a letter from the plaintiff's 
attorney which informed the immediate seller that "this office has been retained 
by [plaintiff] to represent him in his claim for personal injuries ... resulting 
from ... your faulty equipment" satisfied plaintiff's section 2-607 responsibili-
ties.110 The court construed Official Comment 5 to require from a warranty 
beneficiary only good faith notice of the injury and held that both the timeliness 
105. In Souther, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in concluding 
that the requirements of§ 2-607 are inapplicable to a breach caused by late delivery. The trial court 
reasoned that "it would be unreasonable, if not absurd" to require notice when the seller is already 
aware of its failure to make timely delivery. This reasoning overlooks the extent of the buyer's 
obligation. Compliance with § 2-607 not only entails notice of the existence of a nonconformity but 
also requires notice of the buyer's intent to treat the nonconformity as a breach. 
106. 515 N.E.2d 546, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
107. The language of§ 2-607(3)(a) requires that the buyer notify the seller. 
108. 525 A.2d 892, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 433 (R.I. 1987). 
109. See U.C.C. § 2-607 Official Comment 5. 
110. 525 A.2d at 898, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 442. 
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and the content of the plaintiff's notice in this case were adequate to meet this 
standard. 111 
Risk of Loss 
Using a risk of loss case as its vehicle, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals this 
year demonstrated that it is possible to arrive at the proper disposition of an 
issue despite a failure to identify and apply the relevant Code provision. In Ron 
Mead T. V. & Appliance v. Legendary Homes, lnc.,' 12 the plaintiff sought 
payment for household appliances ordered by the defendant home builder. The 
plaintiff had delivered the goods to the buyer's unattended home construction 
site after working hours, placing them in a garage on the premises and locking 
the door. During the night the appliances were stolen. The buyer refused to pay 
the purchase price, claiming that the risk of loss was still with the seller at the 
time of the theft. Citing section 2-509(3),113 the trial court rendered judgment in 
the buyer's favor, reasoning that the risk of loss had not passed to the buyer 
because it had not yet received114 the goods. In an unsuccessful effort to vindicate 
the time and manner of its tender, the seller attempted to prove a usage of trade 
which would permit after-hours delivery to an unattended construction site. 115 
On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that the lower court had not 
erred in rejecting the seller's trade usage argument because of insufficient 
evidence. The court of appeals also agreed with the trial court that the risk of 
loss had not passed because there had been no receipt of the goods by the buyer, 
inasmuch as receipt requires the taking of physical possession.116 The court then 
made a cursory and altogether unconvincing effort to support this holding by 
stating, in conclusory fashion, without citation, that "placing the goods in an 
unlocked garage, in a house under construction, and then locking the door did 
not give the Buyer the opportunity to take physical possession [of them]."m 
111. The court noted that less is required of a third party beneficiary of a warranty in order to 
comply with § 2-607(3)(a). Even so, the notice in this case would have probably been sufficient to 
satisfy even the most stringent standard since it informed the seller of the intent to treat the 
nonconformity as a breach and was timely sent. Perhaps because plaintiff notified all parties in the 
chain of distribution, this opinion does not discuss whether notice to remote sellers and manufactur-
ers is required of a third party beneficiary. Courts are divided on this issue. Rhode Island agrees 
with those jurisdictions which require notice to remote sellers and manufacturers. 
112. 746 P.2d 1163, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 117 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987). (The 
discussion of this case was contributed by Diane Modes.) 
113. Under U.C.C. § 2-509(3), risk of loss "passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the 
seller is a merchant." 
114. Receipt of goods is defined in U.C.C. § 2-103(1 )(c) as "taking physical possession of them." 
115. U.C.C. § 2-503 details the criteria which are essential to a proper tender of delivery by a 
seller. One of these requires that "tender must be at a reasonable hour." U.C.C. § 2-503( 1 )(a). 
Official Comment 3 to § 2-503 elaborates upon this requirement, specifying usage of trade and 
"circumstances of the particular case" as elements which may have relevance in defining a 
reasonable hour for tender. 
116. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c). 
117. 746 P.2d at 1165, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 119. 
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Although the court manages to properly conclude that the risk of loss had not 
passed to the buyer, it does so despite misapplication of the Code's risk of loss 
provisions. Both the trial court and the court of appeals incorrectly cited section 
2-509 as the controlling section. Because of the improper tender by the seller, 
the risk of loss issue in this case should have been resolved by application of 
section 2-510( 1 ). 118 Regardless of whether the goods have been received,119 
under section 2-510(1) the buyer does not bear the risk of loss where the tender 
of delivery is so nonconforming as to give a right of rejection. 120 Once the court 
resolved in the negative the threshold question of whether the seller had made a 
conforming tender of delivery, it should have looked to section 2-510 for 
disposition of the risk of loss issue. It is because of this failure to correctly 
identify the relevant provision that the court needlessly doomed itself to wrestle 
with the slippery concept of possession. 121 The court would not have needed to 
reach this issue if it had recognized section 2-510 as controlling. One must 
wonder how this case would have ended if, all other things being the same, the 
court had decided that the buyer had received the goods. In view of the court's 
apparent ignorance of both section 2-510 and the immateriality of the possession 
issue, it would seem that, notwithstanding the defective tender, the seller would 
have wrongly prevailed. 
Repudiation 
The Code offers no clear guidance as to whether the date of repudiation and 
the breach date necessarily coincide where the nonrepudiating party chooses, 
under section 2-61 O(a), to ignore the repudiation and await performance. There 
is pre-Code case law holding that an anticipatory repudiation is not a breach 
118. U.C.C. § 2-510(1) provides: "Where a tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the 
contract as to give a right of rejection the risk of their loss remains on the seller until cure or 
acceptance." 
119. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968). Cf U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b). 
120. U.C.C. § 2-601 provides broad parameters to a buyer's right of rejection, which may in 
turn be applied to benefit a buyer attempting to come under the protection of § 2-510( 1 ). Because 
the risk of loss does not shift to the buyer when the seller's performance is such that the buyer has a 
right of rejection, the risk therefore will not pass to the buyer when the "goods or the tender of 
delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract." U.C.C. § 2-601. 
121. See R. Nordstrom, Law of Sales § 134 (1970) (discussion of the array of risk of loss 
problems which are spawned by the difficulty of establishing whether receipt of goods has occurred). 
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until the aggrieved party elects to treat it as such.122 At least one commentator 
has noted that some courts continue to adhere to this view .123 
In Energy Cooperative, Inc. v. SOCAP International, Ltd., 124 a repudiation 
case complicated by bankruptcy proceedings, the Seventh Circuit was seemingly 
oblivious to the existence of any uncertainty surrounding this issue. This case 
was an attempt by Energy Cooperative, Inc.'s ("ECI" 's) trustee in bankruptcy 
to recover as a preference a $1.6 million payment made by ECI to SOCAP. The 
transfer was made as compensation for ECI's repudiation of its contract to 
purchase oil from SOCAP. The success of the trustee's claim depended on 
whether the transfer could be characterized as being made "for or on account of 
an antecedent debt." 125 The court correctly recognized that in order to determine 
whether this was in fact the case it would be necessary to determine when the 
debt arose. After an inquiry into the meanings of debt126 and claim127 within the 
context of the Bankruptcy Code, the court concluded that the debt arose at the 
time that SOCAP acquired a claim against ECI. 128 Relying on section 2-610(b), 
which allows the aggrieved party to resort to any remedy for breach as soon as 
repudiation occurs, the court held that SOCAP had a claim for damages 
immediately upon ECl's repudiation on March 11 and that ECl's debt to 
SOCAP was incurred coinstantaneously. Hence, the $1.6 million payment on 
April 16 was a settlement of this antecedent debt. 
In determining the crucial issue of when the debt arose, the court based its 
conclusion on the application of section 2-610(b) without regard to the possible 
122. (This section of the survey was contributed by Diane Modes.) See 4 A. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts§ 981(1951);11 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 1320 (3d ed. 1968). 
The question of whether the date of repudiation may be distinguished from the date of breach is a 
variation on the interpretive problems posed by § 2-713, a provision which has engendered 
considerable confusion. See, e.g., Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1973). 
123. See 4 R. Anderson, supra note 66, § 2-610:18. Cf Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co., 855 F.2d 
997, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1025 (2d Cir. 1988); Sawyer Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. 
Linke, 231 N.W.2d 791, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 102 (N.D. 1975). 
124. 832 F.2d 997, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 99 (text not reprinted) (7th Cir. 1987). 
125. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982). This provision of the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee in 
bankruptcy to recover a transfer which meets five specifications. Only § 547(b)(2), requiring that 
the transfer be "for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was 
made," was at issue here. 
126. 11U.S.C.§101(11) (1982) provides that" 'debt' means liability on a claim." 
127. 11U.S.C.§101(4) provides: 
( 4) "claim" means-
( A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or 
unsecured; or 
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a 
right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, 
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. 
128. 832 F.2d at 1001. Legislative history indicates a clear congressional intent that debt and 
claim be construed synonymously; they differ only in that they represent opposing interests, but in 
the same obligation. See In re Vasu Fabrics, Inc., 39 Bankr. 513, 516-17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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relevance of the other alternatives which section 2-610 offers the nonrepudiating 
party. Although a party may immediately resort to its remedies for breach, it 
may also await performance for a commercially reasonable period of time. 129 
SOCAP waited until the performance date to inform ECI that it would be held 
liable for damages. The timing of this notification raises the possibility that 
SOCAP chose to exercise its option under section 2-610(a) to await perfor-
mance rather than to treat the repudiation as a breach. Arguably, this could 
place the breach, and therefore the acquisition of a right to payment, at the date 
of performance rather than the repudiation date. 
The court in SOCAP simply assumed that the repudiation and the breach 
coincided. This assumption has no important effect here because the settlement 
occurred after the performance date had passed. Yet, if the transfer had been 
made within the time in which the seller might reasonably await performance, 
it could have been viably asserted that the breach and the settlement occurred 
simultaneously. This would be possible if the breach were declared at the 
moment that the settlement was paid. The transfer would not be for or on 
account of an antecedent debt and would escape recovery by the trustee m 
bankruptcy. 
A party may commit an ant1c1patory breach by a clear manifestation of 
unwillingness to perform under the contract. 130 Sometimes, however, circum-
stances may indicate that one of the parties to a contract will be unable or 
unwilling to perform as promised, although there has been no unmistakable 
indication to that effect. The party threatened with the prospect of an impend-
ing breach in this situation may, under section 2-609, protect himself by 
demanding assurance of due performance. 131 If no assurance is forthcoming, 
then the party failing to respond has repudiated the contract. 132 
An interesting twist on this scenario was played out in Central Oil Co. v. 
M/V Lamma Forest. 133 The seller, Central Oil, had already discharged its 
obligation under the contract by providing the British ship Lamma Forest with 
500 metric tons of fuel oil. 134 The relevant terms of the agreement provided that 
the fuel must comply with British standards and that payment was to be made 
within thirty days of delivery. Two weeks after delivery of the oil, Central 
received notice from the buyer that the oil contained aluminum particles in 
129. U.C.C. § 2-610(a). 
130. See U.C.C. § 2-610 Official Comment I: "anticipatory repudiation centers upon an overt 
communication of intention or an action which renders performance impossible or demonstrates a 
clear determination not to continue with performance." 
131. u.c.c. § 2-609(1). 
132. u.c.c. § 2-609(4). 
133. 821 F.2d 48, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1012 (!st Cir. 1987). 
134. Pre-Code law did not recognize anticipatory repudiation as a breach if the contract was 
unilateral, regardless of whether it was originally so or was originally a bilateral contract which was 
made unilateral by the full performance of one party. See E. Farnsworth, Contracts§ 8.20, at 630 
(1982). The Code appears to reject this approach, although it does not do so expressly. See R. 
Hillman, J. McDonnell & S. Nickles, Common Law and Equity Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code§ 8.04(3], at 8-32 (1985). 
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excess of levels allowed by the British standard and that it therefore considered 
the fuel to be nonconforming. Central responded with a demand for assurance 
that payment would be forthcoming. Approximately one week before payment 
was due, having heard nothing from the Lamma Forest, Central sent a repre-
sentative to the ship, then docked in Rhode Island, to attempt negotiations. This 
effort was unavailing. Central then sent another demand, this time not for 
assurance but for immediate payment. When no response was received, and 
with six days still remaining in which the buyer might perform, the seller had 
the Lamma Forest arrested under a maritime lien, based on the Forest's alleged 
anticipatory repudiation. Central implemented these drastic measures in re-
sponse to its belief that the ship would soon leave American waters and the 
jurisdiction of United States courts. In the ensuing suit seeking payment for the 
fuel oil plus interest, the Lamma Forest counterclaimed, inter alia, for breach of 
warranty135 and wrongful arrest. The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the 
lower court, which held that Central had acted upon a good faith belief that the 
buyer had repudiated, thereby vitiating the malice needed to prove wrongful 
arrest. 
The seller in this case availed itself of the protection of section 2-609 in a 
somewhat unusual way. Most commonly, the refuge offered by this provision 
lies in a justifiably worried party's right to suspend its own performance. Even 
when as here this recourse is effectively foreclosed by full performance, section 
2-609 still offers a valuable benefit in that it allows the aggrieved party to 
proceed with suit immediately. In Central, the seller used the provision as a 
shield, a foundation for supporting its good faith belief that a repudiation had 
occurred. 136 
REMEDIES 
Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance 
Assuming that the circumstances of the tender give the buyer the right of 
rejection or revocation of acceptance, that right can be lost in any number of 
ways. In CPC International, Inc. v. Techni-Chem, /nc.,137 the court was faced 
with several. That case involved the purchase of a system of equipment to 
process and refine fructose. Despite the seller's intermittent attempts to correct 
the situation, the buyer continually complained that the system was not meeting 
the production guarantee. Notwithstanding the buyer's suit for breach of 
warranty, it continued to use the equipment. With the help of an outside 
consultant modifications were made to the system, in part, with equipment 
manufactured by another company. Not until four months after this suit was 
filed did the buyer send to the seller's counsel the letter which purported to 
135. The court disposed of the warranty claim with dispatch, holding that the Lamma Forest 
failed to shoulder its burden of proof as to acceptable levels of aluminum under the British standard. 
136. Query whether the court should have inquired into the reasonableness of the demand as a 
threshold issue. If the demand was unjustified, then the buyer was not obliga1ed to respond. 
137. 660 F. Supp. 1509, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 485 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
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revoke the buyer's acceptance. Still, the buyer continued to use the system. In its 
motion for summary judgment the seller argued that the notice of revocation 
was insufficient, that it came too late, and that the right, if it otherwise existed, 
was lost as a result of t}:le buyer's continued use of the system and its modifica-
tion. The district court disagreed. 
According to the court, the notice was not insufficient because it did not 
contain an offer to return the equipment. What was true under prior law is no 
longer true under the Code. 138 Now, notice of revocation is enough.139 On the 
timeliness of the notice, which came sixteen months after delivery, the court 
thought that in light of the repeated attempts to bring the system into line with 
the production guarantee the question should be resolved by the trier of fact. 
Next, the court addressed the issue of post-revocation use. Finding no California 
case on point, the court adopted what it believed to be the better reasoned view. 
It sensibly ruled that use should not be absolutely prohibited where doing so 
would unreasonably increase the buyer's damages. 14° Finally, it was also for the 
trier of fact to decide whether the modification of the system was necessitated by 
the system's own defects. 141 
Not all courts this year have tackled the issue of post-revocation use with the 
same degree of pragmatism as the court in the Techni-Chem case. Fiat Auto 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Hollums142 is a good example of the type of mechanical reasoning 
rejected in Techni-Chem. Following his letter to the manufacturer asking it to 
take back the car, the buyer of the car repaired it, painted it, paid taxes on it, 
insured it, tried to sell it, and drove it over 6,000 miles. Completely ignoring the 
buyer's contention that his conduct was necessary to cut his losses, the court held 
that he had reaccepted the car as a matter of law. 143 Therefore, the trial court 
erred in not granting a directed verdict on the issue of revocation. 144 
138. Under former California Civil Code § 1789(3), the forerunner to U.C.C. § 2-608, the 
buyer's right to rescind was predicated upon the return or an offer to return the goods to the seller. 
See Cal. Com. Code§ 2608 comment 5 (West 1984). 
139. Because notice of breach is mandated even if buyer wishes to retain the goods, the notice of 
rejection or revocation must do more than let the seller know that there is a problem with the goods. 
See McClure Oil Corp. v. Murray Equip., Inc. 515 N.E.2d 546, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (le!ter indicating only that buyer was having problems with 
the goods was an insufficient notice of rejection). 
140. As the court put it, "The beuer reasoned cases stress that 'avoidance of an absolute rule 
against continued use is counseled by the overriding requirement of reasonableness which perme-
ates' the Uniform Commercial Code." 660 F. Supp. at 1515, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 
489 (citing Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 310 A.2d 491, 494, 13 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 449, 454 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973)). 
141. This issue is made relevant by U.C.C. § 2-608(2) ("Revocation ... must occur ... before 
any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects."). 
142. 363 S.E.2d 312, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 969 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). 
143. The court's analysis consists of no more than the following quotation from U.C.C. § 
2-606(1 )(c) Official Comment 4: "[A]ny action taken by the buyer, which is inconsistent with his 
claim that he rejected the goods, constitutes an acceptance." 363 S.E.2d at 315, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) at 972. 
144. The court could have avoided the issue of post-revocation use had it rested its decision on 
the absence of contractual privily between the parti~s. Curiously, no mention is made of the 
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Regardless of how critical the goods are to the buyer's business, rejection will 
not be permitted where post-revocation use makes their return to the seller 
impossible. In j.L. Clark Manufacturing Co. v. Gold Bond Pharmaceutical 
Corp., 145 the buyer purchased metal containers for the packaging of its product, 
pharmaceutical powder. After the containers were supposedly rejected, the 
buyer continued to use them in its production process. The district court held 
that such use constituted reacceptance as a matter of law. The court was 
probably correct. However, in this case, there would be little difference in net 
result if rejection were permitted and the court imposed an obligation on the 
buyer to account to the seller for the use value of the goods. 146 
To conclude, one other case merits a brief word. Does Advanced Computer 
Sales v. Sizemore147 stand for the dubious proposition that although breach of 
warranty may be a sufficient prerequisite to revocation, it is never a necessary 
one? The court does state that "(section 2-608] is an available remedy even 
where the seller has attempted to limit its warranties,"148 but the very next 
sentence-"[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail 
of its purpose, remedy may be had as provided in the commercial code"149-is 
plucked almost verbatim from U.C.C. section 2-719. By failing to distinguish 
adequately between two distinct concepts, the court has considerably weakened 
our understanding of the case. 
Impracticability 
The drafting history of subsection 2-61 S(a)150 suggests that it was intended to 
apply to unforeseen events occurring after the contract was made. 151 The 
drafters appear not to have considered foreseeability of the event, which is so 
popular with courts, as a test. A seller seeking excuse for an event unforeseen at 
the time of contracting satisfies the "failure of basic assumption" test, if (i) the 
overwhelming majority of cases which have held that the remedy of revocation is available only 
against the buyer's immediate seller. See Frisch & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk 
Transfers, and Documents of Title, 43 Bus. Law. 1259, 1288 n.176 (1988). 
145. 669 F. Supp. 40, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 93 (D. R.I. 1987). 
146. Without a right to reject, the buyer would pay the contract price, see U.C.C. 2-709(1)(b), 
less the diminished value of the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-714(2). If permitted to reject and required to 
pay for use value, the buyer's payment would be approximately the same, i.e., the value of the goods 
tendered. 
147. 366 S.E.2d 303, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). 
148. Id. at 305, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 19. 
149. Id., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 19. 
150. U.C.C. § 2-615 provides in pertinent part: 
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation .... 
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies under 
paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as 
agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of 
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made .... 
151. Wladis, Impracticability As Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed Circumstances Upon 
Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 503, 571-76 (1988). 
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seller has not by agreement assumed the risk of the event; (ii) the event directly 
interferes with an essential part of the seller's performance; (iii) the event affects 
sellers generally and not just the individual seller; and (iv) the event is beyond 
the reasonable control of the seller. 152 In many cases the events for which excuse 
is sought satisfy these requirements. Thus, the focus should be on whether the 
events have rendered the seller's performance so burdensome as to make it 
impracticable.153 
Several 1988 cases provide an opportunity to assess what courts do in section 
2-615 cases in light of that section's drafting history. All of these cases concern 
buyers who sought excuse, but section 2-615 can apply to sellers. 154 The first 
case is Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 155 In that 
case, Westinghouse Electric Corporation ("Westinghouse") entered into three 
contracts in 1966 with Florida Power & Light Company ("the utility") in 
which Westinghouse agreed to construct two nuclear power plants for the 
utility. Westinghouse also agreed to supply the plants with uranium fuel for ten 
years and to remove and dispose of spent fuel for a like period. Though at the 
time they contracted there was virtually no limited fuel reprocessing capacity 
available, the parties assumed that the spent fuel would be removed to facilities 
where it would be reprocessed. 156 This assumption was based upon the govern-
ment's assurance that it would reprocess spent fuel until commercial reprocess-
ing facilities became available, as well as the existence of a developing, if 
nascent, commercial reprocessing industry. However, by 1975, when Westing-
house was to remove and dispose of spent fuel, no commercial reprocessing 
facilities existed, nor were there any facilities which could store the spent fuel. 157 
Therefore Westinghouse refused to remove the spent fuel from the utility 
plants' premises, provoking this suit. This case thus concerns a situation in 
which the parties entered into a contract assuming that certain events would 
occur (reprocessing facilities would become available) and those events failed to 
152. Id. at 576-78, 580-82. 
153. The view of Karl Llewellyn, Chief Draftsman of the section, was that an increase in the 
cost of performance of two to three times the normal cost was the threshold of impracticability. Id. at 
584. 
154. Typically, buyers of goods find it more difficult than sellers to be excused from performance 
for supervening events. Nevertheless, the drafters intended that buyers be covered by U.C.C. 
§ 2-615. See U.C.C. § 2-615 Official Comment 9. See also Wladis, supra note 151, at 504 n.2. 
Official Comment 9, though it indicates that buyers are not to be treated quite the same as sellers, 
focuses on events that affect the individual buyer rather than the systemic market failures referred to 
in Official Comment 4, which discusses seller excuse for increased cost. Thus, even though it might 
be argued that different considerations distinguish seller excuse from buyer excuse, it is submitted 
that where systemic market failures affect a contract, the factors to be considered in determining 
whether or not to excuse are the same whether the party seeking excuse is a seller or a buyer. 
155. 826 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1574 (1988). 
156. Reprocessing involves removing the most valuable and dangerous components, uranium 
and plutonium, from the spent fuel. These elements can then be recycled into fresh fuel. 826 F.2d at 
248-49 (quoting from Nuclear Regulatory Commission order describing reprocessing process). 
157. See 826 F.2d at 249-51 (describes the reasons why reprocessing of spent fuel fell into 
disrepute). 
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occur. Westinghouse defended principally upon the ground of commercial 
impracticability. 158 
The district court issued three opinions. The first opinion found Westing-
house to have breached its obligation to remove and dispose of the spent fuel but 
deferred granting a remedy. 159 After this opinion, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
became law in 1983. This act provided for construction of long-term storage 
facilities for spent fuel as a substitute for reprocessing. 160 Subsequently, the 
district court issued a second opinion excusing Westinghouse from its obligation 
to remove and dispose of the fuel and ordering an equitable adjustment of the 
contract under which Westinghouse was to pay essentially all of the $30 million 
cost of short-term on-site storage of the fuel until a long-term storage facility 
became available. The utility was to bear the $70 million expense of long-term 
storage.161 In its third opinion,162 the district court reversed itself and refused to 
excuse Westinghouse. It split the short-term on-site storage costs between the 
parties and imposed the long-term storage costs upon Westinghouse. On appeal, 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the allocation of short-term storage costs between 
the parties because that part of the district court's third opinion had not been 
appealed. However, it reversed the imposition of long-term storage costs upon 
Westinghouse. This result allocated the $100 million expense of storing the 
spent fuel as follows: Westinghouse was to pay $18 million; the utility was to 
pay the remaining $82 million. 
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Westinghouse had established the defense 
of impracticability on several theories. According to the first theory, Westing-
house had demonstrated that the parties' contemplated method for disposing of 
spent fuel (reprocessing) was the only possible method of disposal, both when 
the parties contracted in 1966 and when Westinghouse was to begin to perform 
in 1975. Furthermore, this sole method of disposal did not exist when Westing-
house was to perform. The court said this was a "textbook illustration" of 
158. Westinghouse also asserted several other defenses: (i) common law impossibility, which the 
district court said was the same as commercial impracticability under the U.C.C., see Florida Power 
& Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts 
Litig.), 517 F. Supp. 440, 450, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 930, 945 (E.D. Va. 1981 ); (ii) 
excuse under a contractual force majeure clause; (iii) frustration of purpose; and (iv) mutual 
mistake. See 826 F .2d at 242. Although the district court ruled on each of these defenses, see 517 F. 
Supp. at 450-60, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 945-60, the Fourth Circuit disposed of 
the case by ruling for Westinghouse on the impracticability/impossibility defense. 826 F.2d at 262. 
159. 517 F. Supp. 440, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 930 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
160. Long-term storage is not an immediate solution because storage facilities will not be 
available for 10-20 years. Though the Nuclear Waste Policy Act states that such facilities will not 
be available until at least 1998, see 597 F. Supp. at 1472, a realistic date is 2010. 826 F.2d at 277. 
161. This opinion is unreported. It is described in the opinion of the Fourth Circuit. See 826 
F.2d at 257-58. 
162. 597 F. Supp. 1456 (E.D. Va. 1984), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 826 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1574 (1987). 
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circumstances warranting application of the impracticability doctrine. 163 Ac-
cording to the second theory, Westinghouse had established that the unavail-
ability of reprocessing facilities was an occurrence which was both unexpected 
and unforeseeable when the parties contracted; this satisfied the "failure of basic 
assumption" test. 164 Also, Westinghouse had demonstrated that the lack of 
reprocessing facilities was beyond its reasonable control. 165 Finally, the lack of 
reprocessing facilities had rendered Westinghouse's performance impracticable. 
The court gave two reasons for its conclusion on this point. First, the alternative 
to reprocessing, long-term storage, had not been possible when Westinghouse 
was to perform and was not yet possible. Thus it was not an alternative means 
of performance. Second, even if the court were to consider long-term storage as 
an alternative to reprocessing, it was not a reasonable alternative. The court 
stated that, if the cost of long-term storage were imposed on Westinghouse, not 
only would Westinghouse fail to receive the $18-20 million contemplated profit 
on the utility fuel disposal contract, the cost to Westinghouse would be well over 
$80 million. The court found this result to be so excessive and unreasonable as 
to render Westinghouse's performance impracticable.166 
A final factor in the Fourth Circuit's decision to excuse Westinghouse was the 
effect of the decision to excuse or not to excuse upon the parties. 167 The court 
had previously noted that Westinghouse would have a net loss on all three 
contracts with the utility even if it were excused from performing the fuel 
disposal contract. 168 The court noted that the utility would likely be able to pass 
163. 826 F.2d at 265. This is not quite so. The cases concerning failure of a contemplated source 
usually involve a source which existed when the contract was made and which later ceased to exist. 
See, e.g., cases collected in Wladis, supra note 151, at 601-03 ("I. Problems With Plant of Seller or 
Supplier"), 615-16 ("K. Goods or Supply Source Destroyed, Damaged, or Ceases to Exist"). When 
the source is one which did not exist when the contract was made and which failed to come into 
existence, the cases do not grant excuse. Id. at 616 ("L. Supply Source Does not Come Into 
Existence"); see also id. at 612 ("G. Technological Impossibility"). Furthermore, if reprocessing 
was the only means of disposal and was not yet available when the parties made the contract, then 
the case is one of existing impracticability, for which there is no excuse unless the promisor had no 
reason to know the facts that affect his performance. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 266 
( 1981 ). Here, Westinghouse clearly knew the relevant facts when it entered the fuel disposal 
contract. 
164. 826 F.2d at 266-74. 
165. Id. at 274-76. 
166. The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court's method of determining whether 
performance was impracticable. Id. at 277. The district court had focused on Westinghouse's 
revenues and costs to perform all three contracts with the utility. In this calculation the cost of long-
term storage was only one element. It amounted to 40-45% of total revenues under all the contracts. 
When this cost was added to Westinghouse's losses on the other two contracts, the total cost would 
be just under 50% of total contract revenues under all the contracts. The district court held these 
percentages not to be insufficient for excuse. 597 F. Supp. at 1477-78. The Fourth Circuit criticized 
the district court's calculation for considering Westinghouse's costs and revenues on the other two 
contracts. The correct comparison, said the Fourth Circuit, was of costs and profits or revenues for 
only the fuel disposal contract. 826 F.2d at 277. 
167. 826 F.2d at 279. 
168. Id. at 277. 
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the cost of fuel disposal onto its ratepayers who were already reaping substan-
tial benefits from cost savings resulting from the utility's switch to nuclear 
power. It was estimated that the ratepayers would save just under $2 billion in 
electric costs during the life of Westinghouse's fuel disposal contract, and $8 
billion over the expected life of the nuclear plants. In the court's view it was fair 
to allocate the relatively small cost of fuel disposal against this large saving. 
Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that Westinghouse should be excused from its 
obligations under the fuel disposal contract. 
Several cases dealt with contracts in which purchasers of natural gas entered 
into "take-or-pay" contracts with natural gas producers in which the purchasers 
agreed to take minimum quantities of gas or pay for gas not taken. 169 When the 
demand for natural gas sagged in the early 1980s, 170 a rash of litigation ensued 
in which purchasers attempted to evade liability. In one case they were unsuc-
cessful;171 in the other, they were partially successful. 
In the first case, Golsen v. ONG Western Inc.,172 decided by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, the purchaser (ONG) had entered into a fifteen-year take-or-
pay contract in September 1981 just before the crisis in the natural gas market 
developed. 173 When the purchaser failed to take or pay for the minimum 
contractual quantities the seller sued. The trial court excused the purchaser on 
two grounds. First, the collapse of the demand for natural gas constituted a 
"failure of gas ... markets" under a contractual force majeure clause. Second, 
Oklahoma law made it illegal for the seller to produce and thus tender more gas 
than the purchaser could take. On appeal the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
reversed. It held the force majeure clause inapplicable to the decline in demand 
for natural gas because other provisions of the contract implied that the 
purchaser had assumed this risk of declining demand. 174 The court further held 
169. These agreements resulted, in part, because the relative scarcity of natural gas in the early 
1970s gave gas producers the bargaining power to negotiate such contracts with their customers, 
natural gas pipelines. See Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain 
Meaning of the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 185, 191-92 (1987), 
and authorities cited there. 
t 70. The demand for natural gas sagged for several reasons: increasing market price caused by 
deregulation of most natural gas prices in 1978; declining oil prices which made oil an attractive 
energy alternative to natural gas; energy conservation efforts; a severe economic recession; and 
abnormally warm weather during the 1982-83 heating season. See Turner, Natural Gas-Impact 
of Deregulation or Reregulation on Sales Contracts, 29 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 501, 510-13 
(1983); Comment, Take-or-Pay Provisions: Major Problems for the Natural Gas Industry, 18 St. 
Mary's L.J. 251, 257-59 (1986). 
171. Generally, purchasers have not been able to use U.C.C. § 2-615 to avoid liability under 
take-or-pay contracts if the seller decides to litigate. See Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 
169, at 233 n.152 for citations to relevant cases. 
172. 756 P.2d 1209, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 605 (Okla. 1988). 
t 73. Turner, supra note 170, at 5t1. 
174. In finding that the force majeure clause did not apply the court reviewed the contract and 
found the parties' general purpose to be to "[assure] themselves of the ability to purchase and sell 
for a term of years at a bargained-for price." 756 P.2d at 1213, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
at 610. It then held that to interpret the force majeure clause to excuse the purchaser would frustrate 
that general purpose. The court buttressed this conclusion by reciting the extensive contract 
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that Oklahoma law did not make illegal the tender of more gas than the 
purchaser could sell. In a concurring opinion, two judges held that the pur-
chaser was not excused under U.C.C. section 2-615. In their view the purchaser 
had failed to prove both that the gas crisis was unforeseeable and that the cost to 
the purchaser was so extreme and unreasonable as to make its performance 
impracticable. 
The second case, Resources Investment Corp. v. Enron Corp.,175 was decided 
by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Here producers 
of natural gas brought suit on thirty-two take-or-pay contracts executed over a 
period of eighteen years. The purchasers defended on various grounds including 
impossibility /commercial impracticability and excuse under contractual force 
majeure clauses. The producers moved to strike several of these defenses 
including those of frustration of purpose, impracticability, and force majeure. 176 
As a basis for the impracticability defense, the purchasers alleged the occurrence 
of a variety of events that had precipitated the natural gas crisis in the early 
1980s.177 The court held that the only possible excusing events were the 
abnormally warm weather and the enactment of federal and state regulatory 
legislation. Thus it permitted the defenses of frustration and impracticability to 
survive. The court dismissed the force majeure defense because of the purchas-
ers' failure to comply with notice requirements contained in the force majeure 
clause. 
In these three cases, and in most impracticability cases, the concept of implicit 
risk assumption lurks on the threshold. Indeed in many cases it can be the 
determining factor. Thus in the Florida Power & Light case the district court 
refused to excuse Westinghouse in large measure because it believed that 
Westinghouse had assumed the risk that reprocessing facilities would not 
become available. Similarly in Golsen, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that 
the contract in suit implicitly allocated to the purchaser the risk of the decline in 
demand for natural gas. In some instances courts infer the allocation of risk 
from other provisions in the contract, and sometimes they infer the allocation of 
risk from the fact that the events in question were foreseeable when the parties 
contracted. Such inferences can be proper when they are strong and compelling 
but in many cases the inferences are debatable and controversial. 178 In any event, 
provisions for price redetermination upon the occurrence of certain events. The court stated that to 
excuse the purchaser under the force majeure clause would frustrate these specific provisions as 
well. Id. at 1214, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 610-11. 
175. 669 F. Supp. 1038, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 616 (D. Colo. 1987). 
176. The other defenses included attacks on the legality of the "take-or-pay" clauses as: (i) 
against public policy; (ii) a violation of state conservation and proration laws; and (iii) penalty or 
unenforceable liquidated damages clauses. The purchasers also attacked the "take-or-pay" clauses 
as unconscionable and as the result of mutually mistaken assumptions. They also alleged frustration 
of purpose. The court dismissed all these defenses. 669 F. Supp. at 1039-43. 
177. Id. at 1043. For a listing of these events see supra note 170. 
178. Cf Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc., 756 P.2d at 1221-22, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 613-14 (Kauger, J., concurring) (referring to effect of loose interpretation of 
foreseeability standard on defense of impracticability). 
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these inferences play a far more significant role in deciding cases under U.C.C. 
section 2-615 than the Code drafters seem to have intended. 
Perhaps the time has come to return to the drafter's intent. The decision to 
excuse for commercial impracticability under U.C.C. section 2-615 should be 
essentially a two-step process. First one must decide whether the event for 
which excuse is sought was foreseen at the time the parties made their contract. 
If not, and if certain other conditions are satisfied, 179 then the nonoccurrence of 
that event was a basic assumption on which the contract was made. All this 
means is that the contract fails to provide for the occurrence of that event. There 
is, thus, a gap in the contract which needs filling. That gap is filled by the 
second step: Has the event rendered performance impracticable? If so, the 
promisor is excused; if not, he must perform or pay damages. The test of 
impracticability is onerous. If the unforeseen event does not render performance 
physically impossible but only increases the cost of performance, then the 
promisor, to be excused, must show that the increased cost is extreme and 
unreasonable. 180 Under this standard, a court should be permitted to consider 
the effect of excuse or nonexcuse upon the respective parties, as did the Fourth 
Circuit in the Florida Power & Light case. Since, in many of the litigated cases, 
events causing extreme cost increases will not have been foreseen, the practical 
effect of this two-step approach will be to focus analysis upon the effect of 
excuse or nonexcuse upon the respective parties. This approach is fairer than 
one that wrestles with the ill-defined concept of implicit risk assumption. 
The approach recommended here is not incompatible with the parties' 
freedom to contract. If the parties explicitly-or by trade usage, course of 
dealing, or course of performance-allocate the risk of an event or the risks of 
unforeseen events generally, that allocation shouid be honored. But just because 
the parties have in fact allocated some risks by their contract, this does not mean 
that they have allocated all the risks. When parties agree, for example, to a fixed 
price contract, they allocate reasonable risks of price fluctuation, but not 
unreasonable risks. Similarly, when the parties demonstrate awareness of future 
risks-for example, by drafting flexible pricing or flexible quantity terms-
again they allocate a reasonable range of fluctuations beyond the limits so 
provided. Yet, should an unusual and unforeseen fluctuation occur that would 
cause extreme and unreasonable cost to one party, then absent strong evidence 
otherwise, the contract should not be read to have implicitly allocated that risk. 
Thus, for example, in the Golsen case, the court could have construed the 
flexible provisions to cover reasonable fluctuations in the demand for gas and 
the "failure of gas markets" provision in the force majeure clause to cover 
unreasonable fluctuations; unfortunately it chose to view them as inconsistent. 
The time has come to recognize that contracts typically allocate only some 
179. See supra text accompanying note 152. 
180. For cases see Wladis, supra note 151, at 584 n.323. This appears to be consistent with the 
drafter's intent. Id. 
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risks. 181 When risks not allocated occur, the soundest basis for deciding whether 
to excuse or not is the relative effect of that decision upon the respective parties. 
The opinion of the Fourth Circuit in the Florida Power & Light case moves the 
law in this direction and for that reason is to be applauded. 
Reclamation 
It is well settled that a seller may reclaim under Bankruptcy Code section 
546(c) and U.C.C. section 2-702 only those goods which are identifiable and in 
the buyer's possession when it receives the reclamation demand. 182 In re Wheel-
ing-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. 183 illustrates some of the interpretive problems that 
lurk within such an apparently simple rule. Just prior to the buyer's bank-
ruptcy, the seller sold and delivered low volatile coal. On the date written 
demand was made for reclamation, some of the coal had been manufactured into 
coke and some was sitting atop low volatile coal of like grade supplied by other 
sellers. 
First, the bankruptcy judge held that U. C. C. section 2-702 does not extend 
the right of reclamation to products of goods. He noted that the section's first 
reference to "goods" means the goods purchased and that the subsequent 
reference to "the goods" obviously refers to the "goods" first mentioned. 184 The 
judge further buttressed his opinion by pointing to the absence of any mention 
of products in the Code's definition of "goods"185 and to U.C.C. section 9-315 as 
evidence that the drafters knew how to use the term "products" when they 
wanted to. 186 Accordingly, the seller had no right to reclaim the coke. 187 
If a seller can trace its goods into a product, what policy reason is there for 
denying reclamation? The most compelling is that the product consists of value 
added by the buyer which, if given to the seller, would be paid for by buyer's 
other creditors. But why not recognize a claim limited by the value of the 
original goods, rather than the value of the product? In fact, the court essen-
181. See generally Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 860 
( 1968). Some courts have grasped this point. See Wladis, supra note 151, at 568 n.244. 
182. See, e.g., In re Rawson Food Serv., 846 F.2d 1343, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
128 (11th Cir. 1988) (proof of possession is a necessary part of seller's prima facie case). 
183. 74 Bankr. 656, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 79 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987). 
184. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) begins as follows: "Where the seller discovers that the buyer has 
received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten 
days after receipt .... " (Emphasis added.) 
185. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1). 
186. See U.C.C. § 9-315(1) ("Ha security interest in goods was perfected and subsequently the 
goods or a part thereof have become part of a product or mass, the security interest continues in the 
product or mass ... . ").See also Frisch, U.C.C. Section 9-375: A Historical and Modern Perspec-
tive, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1985). 
187. The seller also argued, without regard to U.C.C. § 2-702, that the common law of accession 
gave it the right to reclaim. The court correctly rejected this assertion on the ground that the buyer 
owned the materials, including the coal sold by the seller, see U.C.C. § 2-401, that went to make up 
the whole. 
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tially took this approach when it recognized the seller's claim to the unprocessed 
coal. 188 
Returning again to the definition of goods which we are told includes "an 
undivided share in an identified bulk of fungible goods," 189 Judge Bentz was 
able to reach a different result with regard to the unprocessed coal. 190 After 
determining that fungible goods could be reclaimed, he held that the identifica-
tion requirement was satisfied where, as here, the goods can be traced into an 
identifiable mass shown to consist of goods of like kind and grade. However, 
concerned that actual reclamation of coal of the kind and grade sold by the seller 
would inaccurately measure the seller's entitlement on the date of its demand, 
the court granted an administrative claim in the amount of the purchase price 
plus interest at the legal rate. 191 It is curious that despite the court's concern that 
the seller not be over or undercompensated, the court selected an interest rate 
which has no relation to the seller's lost opportunity cost. 192 
Courts continue to grapple with the appropriate relationship between Bank-
ruptcy Code section 546(c) and U.C.C. section 2-702. Although nothing within 
the former section indicates that it was intended as anything but a safe-harbor 
from the trustee's avoidance powers, most courts have held that compliance with 
its provisions is essential. 193 Occasionally, however, a dissenting voice is heard. 
In In re Bearhouse, 194 the bankruptcy court considered the effect of a timely oral 
demand on a seller's right to reclaim. The court distinguished the case before it 
from the bulk of those which have construed the written demand requirement of 
section 546(c) as mandatory. Those cases involved a bankruptcy filing within 
ten days after the delivery of the goods, whereas here, the filing occurred after 
the ten-day demand period had expired. Thus, on the petition date, compliance 
with section 546(c) was no longer possible. The court reasoned that to make 
insufficient that which was sufficient when done would be "inconsistent with 
fundamental principles of due process of law."195 But, having the right to 
reclaim in the abstract is one thing; having it hold up against the trustee's 
asserted avoidance powers is quite another. Looking to pre-Code Arkansas case 
law, the court held that since the right would be superior to the lien of a 
188. At the time of the court's decision, the unprocessed coal, too, had been processed into coke. 
189. 74 Bankr. at 660, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 84. 
190. Actually there is no reference to fungible goods in the definition. What Judge Bentz calls 
part of the definition is apparently the statement in U.C.C. § 2-105( 4) that "[a]n undivided share in 
an identified bulk of fungible goods is sufficiently identified to be sold although the quantity of the 
bulk is not determined." 
191. The court felt that the seller would be over or undercompensated depending on whether the 
current price for similar coal was higher or lower than it was on the date its return was demanded. 
192. Also worthy of note is the decision to award interest from the date of demand. This fails to 
account for the inevitable delay that the seller would have experienced in its attempt to dispose of 
the coal. 
193. See, e.g., In re Rozel Indus., 74 Bankr. 643, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1448 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) and cases cited therein. 
194. 84 Bankr. 552, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1124 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988). 
195. 84 Bankr. at 560, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1133. 
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judgment creditor it withstands avoidance under Bankruptcy Code section 
544(a)( 1 ). 
The result is unobjectionable but the opinion seems strained and incomplete. 
The timing of the bankruptcy petition is, in this context, hardly a sufficient 
ground on which to differentiate the rights of sellers. One suspects that Judge 
Mixon sought an excuse to deviate from the weight of authority and found one. 
However, missing from the opinion is a consideration of several other poten-
tially applicable avoidance powers. 196 
Buyer's Money Remedies and Their Limitations 
Crucial to a buyer's right to recover "cover" damages is a "reasonable 
purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the 
seller."197 Whether the cover goods were reasonable substitutes for the contract 
goods was considered by the Iowa Supreme Court in Kanzmeier v. McCop-
pin. 198 The seller entered into a contract to sell 360 head of feeder cattle for $60 
per hundred weight. The seller almost immediately noticed that similar cattle 
were selling for slightly more, so he informed buyer's agent that he was not 
quite ready to sell. A day later he sold to a third party for $62 per hundred 
weight. Not surprisingly, the buyer sued. The trial court awarded damages 
under U.C.C. section 2-712 based on the difference between $60 per hundred 
weight (contract price) and the hundred weight price of 358 head of replace-
ment cattle. 
The supreme court reversed. The court found a fundamental problem with 
the cover: The replacement cattle weighed on the average 135 pounds less than 
the seller's cattle. The court stressed that cover means commercially usable as a 
reasonable substitute. The goods need not be identical to those under the 
original contract but they must be a substitute of like kind. Whether an item is 
cover is a question of fact. However, after reviewing the record the court found 
no substantial evidence that the 358 replacement cattle were a reasonable 
substitute. Consequently, the damage award was overturned. The case was 
remanded for retrial of damages under U.C.C. section 2-713199 and for consider-
ation of the buyer's lost profits claim. 
What seems remarkable is the court's method of comparing the replacement 
cattle with the seller's cattle. First, the seller had "big steers" that could be fed 
out for an April market. Since the replacement cattle were lighter and were 
purchased later, they could not be ready for market until almost two months 
after the seller's cattle. Second, since the seller's cattle were local and out of one 
group, inferentially they would be more prone to sickness. 
196. Absent the protection of 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1982), the right of reclamation could be 
challenged as a statutory lien under§ 545(1 )(D) or a preferential transfer under§ 547. 
197. u.c.c. § 2-712(1). 
198. 398 N.W.2d 826, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1084 (Iowa 1987). 
199. The basic measure of damages under this section is the difference between the contract 
price and the market price at the time the buyer learned of the breach. 
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Finally, there was no evidence that the price of lighter cattle was similar to 
the price of heavier cattle at the time of purchase. Since the buyer may have 
paid more per pound for lighter animals, there was, in the court's view, no way 
to tell whether the higher cover price resulted from a market increase. This 
analysis may leave a farmer puzzled. Must the non-breaching party find a herd 
the same size as the breaching party's herd, in the same locale, with cattle at the 
same weight within a reasonable time? When asked if he could find anything 
comparable, the non-breaching farmer answered: "No." 
The buyer's entitlement to cover damages was also involved in State of New 
Mexico ex rel. Concrete Sales & Equipment Rental Co. v. Kent Nowlin 
Construction Co. 200 There the buyer, a general contractor, was awarded a state 
contract for highway construction. It then subcontracted with the seller for the 
purchase of crushed aggregate materials. When the seller failed to timely supply 
an adequate amount of intermediate aggregate, the buyer purchased the mate-
rial from another subcontractor. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded 
that the buyer's subsequent acceptance of a partial delivery by the seller did not 
preclude recovery on the basis of the previous cover. There is no need, the court 
said, either to cancel an installment contract or to notify the breaching seller 
before exercising the remedy of cover. Moreover, in a confused reference to 
U.C.C. section 2-612(3), the court observed that a partial delivery is not a 
nonconforming installment. 201 
The issue whether a particular loss is an appropriate item of consequential 
damages has always been one of the more frequently litigated remedial issues. 
This year was no exception. In Fortin v. Ox-Bow Marina, Inc., 202 a Massachu-
setts court for the first time was called upon to decide whether interest on money 
borrowed to refinance a loan on a trade-in in order to make a new purchase (a 
boat) is recoverable when the buyers have properly revoked their acceptance. 
The court held that it was203 but failed to adequately explain why winterizing 
and storage charges as well as the initial loan application and approval fees 
were not. In Navistar International Corp. v. Hagie Manufacturing Co.,204 a 
buyer sought to recover lost profits from the anticipated resale of goods that it 
would have contracted to purchase from the seller if no problems in their 
existing contractual relationship had arisen. Rejecting this claim, the district 
court wisely concluded that a seller is not responsible for losses associated with 
goods that it is under no obligation to sell. 
200. 106 N.M. 539, 746 P.2d 645, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 598 (1987). 
201. Under U.C.C. § 2-612(3), acceptance of a nonconforming installment without notice of 
cancellation reinstates the contract if there had been a prior breach of the whole contract. But this is 
a reference to the future, not the past. There is nothing in this provision which would suggest that 
reinstatement excuses a breach or precludes a cover measure of damages for that breach. 
202. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1046 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1987). 
203. On the theory that an award of lump sum damages permits a replacement purchase 
without the need for further borrowing, other courts have held that the interest on money borrowed 
to make a purchase is not recoverable. See, e.g., Barnard v. Compugraphic Corp., 35 Wash. App. 
414, 667 P.2d 117, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 141 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983). 
204. 662 F. Supp. 1207, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1096 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
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In In re Meyertech Corp., 205 the application of one measure of damages 
yielded the sum of $11 ,912.50, whereas the application of another measure 
would have yielded the sum of $404,404.55. Not surprisingly, the parties 
disagreed on which measure was appropriate. The buyer had incorporated the 
seller's fittings into sprinkler systems which it had installed in a number of 
construction projects. When the fittings turned out to be defective, the buyer was 
forced to replace them and to repair damage caused by water leaks. The 
bankruptcy court rejected the buyer's claim for damages based upon the total 
cost theory. 206 Instead, it awarded as damages the cost of replacing the faulty 
fittings. Its rationale was that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
buyer's bid estimates on the construction jobs. On appeal, the Third Circuit 
agreed that the total cost method was inappropriate but for a different reason, 
i.e., the cost of replacement established the loss with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy. Curiously, there is no mention of any allowance for the cost incurred 
in repairing the water damage. This may account for the enormous disparity in 
the results between the two measures. 
A number of cases involving attempts by sellers to limit the buyer's remedies 
were litigated this year. Several are worthy of comment. · 
In Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co., 201 the plaintiff purchased a herbicide 
manufactured by the defendant to control weeds in growing cotton. The jury 
found a breach of the express warranty that the product would control weeds 
and grasses and that the breach of warranty was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's losses of $150,000 in crop damage and $6,000 in direct economic loss 
in the value of the herbicide. The trial court ruled sua sponte that the clause in 
the contract precluding recovery of consequential damages was unconscionable. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court's 
practice of raising the issue sua sponte during the charge conference immedi-
ately before submitting the case to the jury was prejudicial to the defendant 
because a court must have evidence to establish unconscionability and because a 
party whose term or contract is challenged as being unconscionable must be 
given fair notice in order to provide evidence to the contrary. The latter ruling is 
clearly required by the second subsection of U.C.C. section 2-302, whereas the 
former, that there must be evidence of unconscionability before such a determi-
nation can be made, does not appear to accord with either the express language 
of section 2-302 or the practice of many courts, particularly in consumer 
transactions. The appellate court found the limitation of liability to be a mere 
allocation of risk permitted by the Code, absent oppression and unfair surprise. 
205. 831 F.2d 410, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 354 (3d Cir. 1987). 
206. Damages under the total cost theory would equal the buyer's costs incurred for overruns on 
the construction projects where the repairs were necessitated. To be applicable, the following 
requirements must be met: (i) The nature of the particular losses make it impossible or highly 
impracticable to determine them with a reasonable degree of accuracy; (ii) the plaintiff's bid or 
estimate was realistic; (iii) its actual costs were reasonable; and (iv) it was not responsible for the 
added expenses. 831 F.2d at 419, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 358 (citing John F. 
Harkins Co. v. School Dist., 313 Pa. Super. 425, 460 A.2d 260 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)). 
207. 816 F.2d 199, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 395 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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Although the court discussed the many factors which might cause the failure of 
a crop treated with an herbicide as a reason for including the remedy limitation, 
such clauses appear to be included in such contracts mainly because the farmer 
is in a better position to know the extent of and protect against consequential 
damages. The farmer may protect against consequential damages by diversify-
ing the kinds of herbicides he uses and/ or by obtaining crop insurance to the 
extent it is commercially available. 
In Nunes Tur/grass, Inc. v. Vaughan-Jacklin Seed Co.,208 the court upheld a 
limitation of remedies to return of the purchase price for grass seed that was 
sold in violation of an express warranty that it conformed to federal label 
descriptions and an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The 
seller and the buyer, who had done business together for approximately twenty 
years, entered into a contract for the sale and purchase of a perennial ryegrass 
for overseeding fields of bluegrass. The defendant delivered seed contaminated 
with an annual rye grass which, when planted by the plaintiff, rendered his 
fields unsuitable for sale as sod. The plaintiff subsequently followed corrective 
measures recommended by the defendant but was unable to market his seed at 
the normal time and was forced to sell his fields for sod. 
The California Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that the 
limitation of remedies was not unconscionable since the parties had dealt 
together for approximately twenty years and that the plaintiff read and under-
stood the limitation of remedies. Moreover, the court cited the fact that the 
plaintiff was a large commercial seller with eight sales outlets in California and 
that the plaintiff placed similar remedy restrictions on its sales of seed. 
These cases are inconsistent with a number of recent cases holding such 
limitations of liability or exclusions of warranty to be ineffective in commercial 
cases of a similar character, although those cases may be distinguished by the 
purported sophistication or lack thereof of the buyers.209 Indeed, absent evidence 
of fraud, duress, or undue influence, there would appear to be no legitimate 
purpose in setting aside clauses limiting liability for consequential damages. 
Finally, consider Comind, Companhia De Seguros v. Sikorsky Aircraft Divi-
sion of United Technologies Corp. 210 In September 197 5 Votec Servi cos Aeros 
Regional, S.A. ("VOTEC") contracted to purchase a helicopter from the 
defendant ("UTC"). VOTEC received delivery in September 1979, paying the 
purchase price of $1.6 million. On March 20, 1980, the helicopter crashed, 
killing fourteen people and destroying the craft. Comind, VOTEC's insurer, 
paid the latter for the costs of the accident and brought the present action to 
recover from the defendants. Evidence available to the court suggested that the 
accident occurred due to failure of a bearing race within the rotary mechanism 
which held the blades in place. The defendants sought summary judgment based 
208. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1518, 246 Cal. Rptr. 823, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 41 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1988). 
209. See, e.g., Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 44 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
588 (6th Cir. 1985); Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696 (S.D. 1982). 
210. 116 F.R.D. 397, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 575 (D. Conn. 1987). 
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on three clauses in the sales contract. First, they relied on a warranty and 
remedy limitation which excluded implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose. A second provision expressly warranted the 
craft against defects in material and manufacture but limited the buyer's remedy 
to repair or replacement of any defective part provided that written notice of 
such defect was given to the defendants within ninety days after the first 
operation of the craft and, in any event, no later than one year after delivery of 
the craft. The contract also provided that seller would not be responsible for any 
damages in contract or tort in excess of $100,000 and in no event for consequen-
tial or incidental damages. Finally, the contract provided that it was to be 
interpreted "in accordance with the plain English meaning of its terms." 
In denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court ruled 
that if the defect were a latent one not reasonably discoverable within the 
ninety-day period, the limited remedy may have failed of its essential purpose 
and operated in a manner to deprive the plaintiff of the substantial benefit of the 
bargain. The court also indicated that this clause might conflict with the 
unlimited express warranty in the previous sentence, in which case the language 
of warranty would prevail over the remedy limitation.211 
The deficiency in the court's analysis, even on a motion for summary 
judgment, was its failure to attempt to ascertain what the purpose of the limited 
remedy was. Perhaps it was to shift the risk, even as to latent defects not 
discovered within ninety days of operation, to the buyer as a means of minimiz-
ing what might have been inherent problems in determining whether the craft 
failed in operation due to a defective part or improper maintenance or to induce 
the plaintiff to inspect the helicopter early in its operation for latent defects 
which might have been more costly to discover in the manufacturing process. It 
may have been that the parties failed to address themselves to the problem of 
latent defects, but the contract provision mandating that the terms be interpreted 
in accordance with their plain English meaning could be argued to preclude 
further inquiry as to whether the ninety-day notice term applied to latent 
defects. 
The court also called into question the clause in the contract which limited 
monetary damages to no more than $100,000 and precluded the plaintiff from 
recovering consequential damages.212 The court opined that the dollar amount 
limitation might be an unreasonable forecast of anticipated loss213 or unconscio-
211. On this point, the court cited Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 
398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 244 N.E.2d 285 (1968). 
212. Although the court treated the dollar amount limitation clause as a liquidated damages 
clause, it did not operate as such in the classical sense since the buyer still had to prove actual 
damages from breach, a requirement which does not exist under a liquidated damages clause. See 5 
Corbin, Contracts § 1062 ( 1964 ). After proving actual direct economic loss, the buyer was then 
restricted in the amount of his recovery up to $100,000. In the language of U.C.C. § 2-718(1), the 
damages were not liquidated "at an amount" since actual loss had to be proved. 
213. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1). 
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nable given the loss of a $1.6 million aircraft. 214 Moreover, the court indicated 
that the clause excluding consequential damages might be unconscionable under 
U.C.C. sections 2-719(3) and 2-302. Given the criteria which courts ordinarily 
use to determine unconscionability, it is difficult to perceive how this clause 
could be considered unconscionable. The buyer clearly had better information 
about the amount of any consequential loss and could (did, in fact) insure 
against such a loss. On the facts given, the limitation of liability for consequen-
tial damages would appear to be an appropriate allocation of the risk of 
insuring against such loss. 
Seller's Money Remedies 
The ability of sellers to recover lost profits under U.C.C. section 2-708(2) has 
been one of the Code's most enduring remedial puzzles.215 Not surprisingly, it 
continues to be the subject of frequent litigation. 
In R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 216 the plaintiff contracted to 
purchase a piece of medical diagnostic equipment manufactured by the defen-
dant. The plaintiff made a $300,000 deposit but subsequently breached by 
refusing to take delivery and pay the balance. The defendant resold the 
equipment to a third party for the same price as the contract price. When the 
plaintiff sued for restitution of the deposit plus interest under U.C.C. section 
2-718(2), the defendant claimed an offset under sections 2-718(3) and 2-708(2) 
as a lost volume seller. The district court entered summary judgment for the 
plaintiff. The court held that a lost volume seller is not entitled to recover 
damages under section 2-708(2) but rather is limited to recovering the difference 
between the resale price and the contract price along with incidental damages 
under U.C.C. section 2-706(1). 
On appeal the Seventh Circuit, following well established case law from 
jurisdictions other than Illinois, stated that section 2-708(2) can be applied in 
situations where a commercially reasonable resale has occurred.217 Of necessity, 
this conclusion was based on a projection of what the Illinois Supreme Court 
would do if the question were presented. However, the Seventh Circuit went 
further and sought to provide guidance on remand. The court addressed the 
matter of the proof required for the seller to establish its lost profit under section 
2-708(2). The value of the case lies in this discussion. 
214. The ceiling may have been a reasonable one for the kinds of direct economic losses 
anticipated to be suffered by breach of the express warranty. 
215. The literature on this section is extensive. See, e.g., Childres & Burgess, Seller's Remedies: 
The Primacy of U.C.C. 2-708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 833 (1973); Harris, A Radical Restatement of 
the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 
66 (1965); Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of U.C.C. Section 2-708(2) (One Profit for the 
Reseller), 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 697 ( 197 3 ). 
216. 826 F.2d 678, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 369 (7th Cir. 1987). 
217. A similar conclusion was reached in two other cases decided this year. See Van Ness 
Motors, Inc. v. Vikram, 221 N.J. Super. 543, 535 A.2d 510, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Malone v. Carl Kisabeth Co., 726 S.W.2d 188, 4 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1075 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
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First, says the court, the seller must prove that it is a Jost volume seller. The 
court starts with the following formula gleaned from precedents: "[A] lost 
volume seller ... [is] one that has a predictable and finite number of customers 
and that has the capacity either to sell to all new buyers or to make the one 
additional sale represented by the resale after the breach."218 
Since a sale has been lost by the breach, the emphasis has been on capacity in 
the precedents cited. The Seventh Circuit states, however, that this emphasis 
imperfectly reflects economic reality because a volume seller (capable of produc-
ing the item to match the breached contract) may be a seller approaching a point 
of diminishing returns; i.e., it may not be worthwhile for a seller to produce one 
more item. Consequently, to establish its case on remand, seller must establish 
not only that it had the capacity to produce the "breached unit" in addition to 
the unit sold, but also that it would have been profitable to do so. 
Thus, the lost volume seller has a double burden to prove its offset under 
section 2-718(3). What proof will suffice? The case offers no guidance. It seems 
that section 2-708(2) could become more complicated than necessary for the 
disposition of run-of-the-mill cases because the court is suggesting nothing less 
than an economic analysis of the seller's business. Obviously, proof of any lost 
profit requires some economic analysis to demonstrate that the seller was doing 
more than breaking even. That, however, appears to be less than what the court 
intended. A lost volume seller must be creative in getting its proof for trial in 
order. 
U.C.C. section 2-704 is designed to give guidance to a seller who has on hand 
unfinished goods at the time of the buyer's repudiation. In particular, subsection 
(2) provides that the "seller may in the exercise of reasonable commercial 
judgment ... either complete the manufacture ... or cease manufacture and 
resell for scrap or salvage value .... " Does this mean that the seller is obliged to 
complete manufacture if it would be commercially unreasonable not to? In 
Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co.,219 the Utah Supreme Court gives an affirmative 
answer without so much as a passing reference to section 2-704. That case 
involved a contract for the sale of 100 not so ordinary pool tables for a total 
purchase price of $55,000. They were to have customized rails designed by the 
buyer to simulate the lighting and sound effects of a pinball machine. Unable to 
develop a satisfactory design, the buyer repudiated after having paid $42,500. 
The seller's response was to dismantle the tables, use the salvageable material to 
manufacture other tables, and send the rest up in smoke as firewood. In the 
buyer's suit for restitution,220 the trial court determined that the seller's actions 
were commercially unreasonable and awarded it as an offset the difference 
between what the buyer paid ($42,500) and what the tables would have sold for 
had the seller completed their manufacture ($21,250). 
218. 826 F.2d at 683, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 375-76 (citations omitted). 
219. 743 P.2d 1212, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 99 (Utah 1987). 
220. As in the Diasonics case, supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text, the buyer's claim for 
the return of all monies paid on the contract arose under U.C.C. §§ 2-718(2), (3). 
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On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court's finding that the doctrine of mitigation of 
damages mandated completion of the tables. With that said, the court proceeded 
as if mitigation had occurred. It held that damages should be determined under 
U.C.C. section 2-708(1 ), thus entitling the seller to an offset equal to the 
difference between the market price of completed tables ($21 ,250) and the 
contract price ($55,000).221 
The court's opinion is disappointing in one important respect. With so much 
potentially at stake, one would have expected more than a summary affirmance 
of the trial court's decision on the issue of commercial reasonableness. For the 
future, sellers and courts need some idea of what factors should be taken into 
account and the relevant weight of each.222 
Interestingly, in another case, on remand, a district court ruled that a general 
duty of mitigation unduly restricts the statutory standard of commercial reason-
ableness. In Masters Machine Co. v. Brookfield Athletic Shoe Co.,223 the seller 
sought recovery of interest expense as an item of incidental damages. 224 One 
issue for the trial court was whether its failure to instruct the jury on the 
general duty to mitigate warranted a new trial. The court believed that not only 
was such an instruction "unnecessary and confusing, it misstates the law."225 
Commercially reasonable expenses are recoverable even if "alternative reason-
able steps were available to [the seller] to minimize such expenses."226 If the 
court meant by this that commercial reasonableness is a standard which may 
221. If the court had approved of the seller's decision to cease production of the tables, the 
applicable measure of its offset (damages) would have been the lost profits formula of U.C.C. 
§ 2-708(2). 
222. In justification of its actions, the seller offered the following explanation: 
[S]elling the tables as "seconds" would damage its reputation for quality and ... the various 
holes, notches, and routings placed in the tables to accommodate the electrical components to be 
installed by buyer weakened the structure of the tables so as to submit seller to potential 
liability if they were sold on the market. 
743 P.2d at 1215, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 102. 
223. 663 F. Supp. 439, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 752 (D. Me. 1987). The prior 
unreported opinion of the First Circuit can be found at 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 749 (!st 
Cir. 1986). 
224. The seller claimed interest, paid after the date of breach, on money borrowed because of the 
buyer's failure to pay the full purchase price. U.C.C. § 2-710 permits an aggrieved seller to recover, 
as incidental damages, "any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in 
stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in 
connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach." 
225. 663 F. Supp. at 443, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 756. Relying on Schiavi Mobile 
Homes v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1190 (Me. 1983), and the 
Official Comment to U.C.C. § 2-710, the court was of the opinion that the general duty of 
mitigation is subsumed by the incidental damages standard of commercial reasonableness. To 
require a further instruction on mitigation would, it thought, confuse the jury and unduly restrict 
the recovery of incidentals. The latter concern is legitimate, however, only if the duty to mitigate is 
not always satisfied by behavior that is commercially reasonable. If so, then the court's conclusion 
regarding subsumption is wrong. 
226. 663 F. Supp. at 442, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 756. 
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validate several alternative courses of action then it is clearly correct. The fact 
that other conduct would have minimized the loss should not decide the issue. 
To say that it does would ignore the seller's intangible interests227 and require of 
it a foresight that only hindsight can judge. 
A second issue in the case involved the trial court's original decision to 
preclude evidence of interest expense incurred by the seller.228 On appeal, the 
First Circuit had held, as a matter of Maine law, that recovery of post-breach 
interest is not limited to loans made specifically to finance the subject matter of 
the contract. Whether the interest expense is incidental damages depends not on 
the type of loan but rather on whether the expense was "commercially reason-
able and foreseeable as a result of the alleged breach."229 
As long as the Code sanctions the recovery of incidental damages and makes, 
at best, the seller's recovery of consequential damages unclear, the courts will 
invariably be called upon to distinguish the two. Not only does the Code make 
this job inevitable, but often so will the contract. In Commonwealth Edison Co. 
v. Allied Chemical Nuclear Products,230 the court had before it a mind-boggling 
claim for some $293 million in storage costs for irradiated fuel refused by the 
buyer and a contractual provision excluding the recovery of consequentials. 
While not disputing the buyer's contention that under pre-Code law incidental 
damages were a subcategory of consequential damages, the court recognized 
that under the Code there is a difference and the difference matters. 231 It 
concluded that the storage costs were recoverable as incidental damages. 232 
Overlooked by the court was the possibility that the intended meaning of the 
term "consequential damages" in the contract was broad enough to encompass 
losses which the Code categorizes as incidental. This case required the construc-
tion of the parties' contract and not, as the court assumed, the application of the 
Code. In the future, parties would do well to make more explicit their intended 
allocation of risks. 
227. Consider, for example, the Madsen case, supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text. Is not 
the seller's interest in preserving its reputation as a maker of quality pool tables as worthy of 
protection as is the buyer's interest in the minimization of liability? 
228. The nature of the interest expense may matter because nowhere does the Code explicitly 
sanction the seller's recovery of consequential damages. Recently, courts have begun to characterize 
interest expense as a recoverable item of incidental damages where the money was borrowed to 
enable the seller to perform the contract in question. See, e.g., Bulk Oil (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Sun Oil 
Trading Co., 697 F.2d 481, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 23 (2d Cir. 1983); Intermeat Inc. v. 
American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 925 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Stokes v. Roberts, 289 Ark. 319, 711 S.W.2d 757, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 520 (1986); 
Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 568 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980). 
229. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 749, 751 (!st Cir. 1986). 
230. 684 F. Supp. 1429, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 380 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
231. According to the court, "If incidental damages were nothing more than a subcategory of 
consequential damages, then§ 2-709 and§ 2-710 would not exist." Id. at 1433, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) at 386. 
232. The storage costs were incidental expenses because they were incurred in the "care and 
custody of goods after the buyer's breach." Id. at 1433, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 385 
(citing U.C.C. § 2-710). 
1490 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 44, August 1989 
Recovery under several Code sections is dependent upon the "identification" 
of goods to the contract.233 This year, two cases dealt with fungible goods. In the 
first, Great Western Sugar Co. v. Pennant Products,234 the seller sued for the 
price of sugar under U.C.C. section 2-709( 1 )(b) following the buyer's refusal to 
accept delivery.235 A Colorado Court of Appeals held that recovery under this 
section was permissible even though no sugar had ever been earmarked for the 
buyer. Relying on a comment,236 case law,237 and Code policy,238 the court 
determined that a showing that the seller always had on hand enough sugar to 
satisfy its obligations met the identification requirement. 
The second case was Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co.239 The contract was for No. 
2 heating oil and the Code section under which the seller sought recovery was 
section 2-706.240 The case is interesting because there were two relevant post-
breach sales. One took place almost immediately after the buyer's breach and 
was of oil previously set aside for delivery to the buyer. The other took place 
almost six weeks later and was of oil for the first time identified to the broken 
contract. The seller argued that it had the right to designate the latter sale as 
controlling for purposes of section 2-706. The Second Circuit stated that, at 
least where fungible goods are concerned, an identification once made is not 
irrevocable. However, any later substitution and resale must be reasonable. 
That is, it must "accurately [reflect] the market value of the goods which are the 
subject of the contract. "241 The most pertinent aspect of reasonableness is 
233. Identification under U.C.C. § 2-501 usually occurs when a particular good is in some way 
earmarked for a particular buyer. The event becomes significant through the application of various 
Code sections. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-502 (identification, in part, conditions the buyer's right to 
recover goods from an insolvent seller), 2-716(3) (identification central to the buyer's replevin 
rights). 
234. 748 P.2d 1359, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1080 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). 
235. 4 U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b) permits the seller to recover the price "of goods identified to the 
contract if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the 
circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing." Here the seller was excused 
from attempts at resale because of a drastic decline in market price and an industry-wide oversupply 
of sugar. 
236. U.C.C. § 2-501 Official Comment 5 ("The mere making of the contract with reference to 
an undivided share in an identified fungible bulk is enough ... to effect an identification if there is 
no explicit agreement otherwise."). 
237. Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'! Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1153 (3d Cir. 1979). 
238. The statement of policy appears in U.C.C. § 2-501 Official Comment 2 ("In view of the 
limited effect given to identification by this Article, the general policy is to resolve all doubts in favor 
of identification."). 
239. 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1025 (2d Cir. 1988). 
240. U.C.C. § 2-706( 1) establishes damages by computing the difference between the amount 
received by the seller from the resale of the goods and the contract price. On the facts given, one 
wonders why the seller did not attempt to establish "lost volume" status and seek recovery under 
u.c.c. § 2-708(2). 
241. 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1037 (citing Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emesall Indus., 
82 Ill. App. 3d 662, 671, 403 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1980)). 
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t1mmg. Here, because of the volatility of the market for No. 2 oil, the second 
sale failed to meet the requirements of section 2-706 as a matter of law . 
. Statutes of Limitations 
This year was eventful for buyers and sellers of artwork. Wilson v. Hammer 
Holdings, Inc. 242 should have sellers breathing a sigh of relief and buyers 
seeking the opinion of an independent expert. In this case, the Wilsons paid 
more than $11,000 to Hammer Galleries ("Hammer") for what was expressly 
guaranteed to be an original painting by Edward Vuillard. Twenty-four years 
later they learned that the painting was not by the French artist. The painting 
was returned to Hammer and suit was brought to recover damages for breach of 
warranty and negligence. 243 On Hammer's motion for summary judgment, the 
district court ruled that the limitations period had run. The court stated that the 
warranty of authenticity was breached at the time of sale, hence the claim was 
long-barred by U.C.C. section 2-725. The exception in section 2-725(2) was 
found to be inapplicable because the warranty made no explicit reference to 
future performance as required by the statute. 
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.244 The opinion nicely 
illustrates that, either by design or by oversight, the potential applicability of 
some Code sections will depend upon the nature of the good involved. Unfortu-
nately for the Wilsons, the nature of a painting is such that the requirements for 
a future performance warranty under section 2-725(2) are not likely to be met. 
For one thing, the court expressed doubt whether the concept of "future 
242. 850 F.2d 3, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 321 (1st Cir. 1988). 
243. The court stated that the Wilsons "returned" the painting to the gallery, but the court says 
nothing about whether the gallery repaid the purchase price. The inclusion of a negligence claim, 
for which an expectation measure of damages is inappropriate, suggests that it did not. Moreover, 
expectation damages, if recoverable under U.C.C. § 2-713, would be difficult to prove. Such was the 
lesson in another case this year, Robert Miller Gallery, Inc. v. Shepard Gallery Assocs., 6 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1076 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), which also involved the misattribution of 
artistic responsibility. 
244. The court also approved the trial court's dismissal of the negligence claim because "the 
essence of the action is to recover money under a sales contract for goods that did not conform to the 
contract. In such instances, the U.C.C. governs the expectations and duties of the buyer and seller." 
850 F.2d at 9, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 329. 
The appellate court assumes without discussion that the Massachusetts statute of limitations is 
applicable. The district court notes the problem and, applying the Massachusetts choice-of-law 
rules, classifies the limitations issue as a procedural one governed by the limitations law of forum. 
Neither opinion analyzes the transaction's contacts with New York and Massachusetts or the 
different governmental interests of these states. Recent developments suggest that courts should pay 
more attention to this conflict of laws issue. In 1982, for example, the National Conference of the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the "Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitation 
Act," which deems statutes of limitations to be substantive in character. The uniform law applies, in 
other words, the limitations law of the state whose law governs the substantive claim itself. More 
recently, the American Law Institute has amended § 142 of the Restatement (Second) of the 
Conflict of Laws to recognize more fully the interests of other states. While the Massachusetts court 
would probably apply the Massachusetts limitation rule under the Restatement test, the test does 
allow for flexibility to consider "exceptional circumstances." 
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performance" could ever extend to a painting. After all, in what way does a 
painting perform? Assuming for the sake of argument that the Wilsons were 
correct in their assertion that it performs by being genuine, the court next asked 
where was the "explicit promise of future performance"? 245 Conceding that 
there may have been an implicit promise, the court felt "that if there is to be an 
exception to the requirements of the exception, it should be up to ... lawmakers 
to design it."246 Finally, the First Circuit pointed out that, even if all else was 
resolved in the Wilsons' favor, their claim would nevertheless fail since section 
2-725(2) requires that discovery of the breach "must await"247 future perfor-
mance. Because the authenticity of the painting does not change with time, the 
Wilsons were no less capable of discovering that the painting was a fake at the 
time of performance than they were at a later time. 
On balance, section 2-725 gave the court little choice but to rule the way it 
did. It seems that the Wilsons would have been better off had they sought to 
avoid the application of section 2-725 by seeking to rescind on the basis of 
mutual mistake of fact. Whether they would have met with success would have 
depended upon the court's view of the continued availability of rescission under 
the Code and the provisions of the relevant non-Code statute of limitations. 248 
While on the subject of exceptions to the general limitations period of section 
2-725, the latently defective product continues to spawn cases involving allega-
tions of fraudulent concealment and other non-statutory escape valves. 249 In 
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co.,250 the defendant, a manufacturer of intrauter-
ine devices, printed a patient brochure warning that pelvic infections had been 
reported, but not that complaints had also been received of pelvic inflammatory 
disease. When the plaintiff-purchaser was unable to conceive because her 
fallopian tubes were blocked, she brought suit for breach of express warranties, 
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and the implied 
warranty of merchantability. When the defendant moved for summary judg-
245. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (emphasis added). 
246. 850 F.2d at 7, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 325. The court called attention to 
legislation in Michigan and New York addressing the issue directly. See Michigan's Works of Fine 
Arts Statute, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 442.322-324 (Callaghan 1982); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 
§ 219-c (West 1988). In the absence of a cross-reference in U.C.C. § 2-725 itself, however, these 
special laws may not be readily known. 
247. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (emphasis added). 
248. The court in Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League, 672 F. Supp. 819, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 449 (E.D. Pa. 1987), ajj'd by order, 833 F.2d 304 (3d Cir. 1987), concluded 
that, for the purpose of determining the relevant statute of limitations, there was no difference 
between "revocation of acceptance" and "rescission for mutual mistake of fact." See also Frisch & 
Wladis, supra note 144, at 1302. 
249. This year's cases include Dade County v. Rohr Indus., 826 F.2d 983, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) 770 (11th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's contention that defendants were estopped from 
asserting the statute was denied); Holstad v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc., 421 N.W.2d 371, 5 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiff's fraudulent concealment 
claim was rejected). 
250. 680 F. Supp. 1293, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 143 (D. Minn. 1988). 
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ment on the ground that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations, the 
plaintiff argued that the statute had been tolled under U.C.C. section 
2-725( 4 )251 because (i) the defendant fraudulently concealed the cause of action, 
(ii) the defendant is estopped from raising the statute as a defense, and (iii) the 
defendant expressly warranted the future performance by including a label 
recommending its use for up to twenty-four months. The district court denied 
the motion because the plaintiff produced extensive evidence in support of her 
claim that the defendant had fraudulently concealed information that, if avail-
able to the plaintiff, would have led her to bring suit at an earlier time. In 
dictum, the court suggested that equitable estoppel would be appropriate in this 
type of case. 
The result in the case is unexceptionable. However, there is possible tension 
in this area between the reference in section 2-725( 4) to the unaltered local law 
on tolling and the general directive in section 1-102( 2 )( c) "to make uniform the 
law among the various jurisdictions." Uniform tolling rules would be desirable. 
It would not seem out of place for a court to consider whether the local tolling 
rules conform with the rules found in other jurisdictions. 
In Ludwig v. Ford Motor Co.,252 a case that arose out of the sale of trucks 
with allegedly defective engines, the Indiana Court of Appeals was confronted 
for the first time with the argument that repair promises and efforts will toll the 
statute of limitations. Recognizing that authority on the issue is divided, the 
facts of the case made it easy for the court to avoid picking sides. Since repairs 
were made during the two-year written warranty period and over thirty-six 
months before plaintiff filed suit, the court thought it obvious that whatever 
delayed the filing of the suit, it was not the attempted repairs. 253 
As in past years, confusion over the theory of the action often makes uncertain 
the applicable statute of limitations. 254 In Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 255 the 
plaintiff was injured while removing a 7,000-pound tire from a piece of 
equipment. The cause of the accident, he claimed, was an inaccurate how-to-do-
it film supplied to his employer by the defendant, the seller of the tire. The trial 
court held that the action was a "product liability action" and time-barred by 
the three-year statute of limitations for such actions. On appeal, the Colorado 
Supreme Court affirmed. It agreed with the trial court's characterization of the 
suit as a product liability action and upheld the constitutionality of treating 
warranty actions under section 2-27 5 differently. 
251. U.C.C. § 2-725( 4) states: "This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of 
limitations .... " 
252. 510 N.E.2d 691, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
253. Even if there were circumstances suflicient to toll the statute, the court, relying on Fablok 
Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 125 N.J. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 449 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973), made the point that the plaintiff must nevertheless be diligent in 
pursuing its claim after cessation of such circumstances. 
254. See Frisch & Wladis, supra note 144, at 1301. 
255. 735 P.2d 168, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 96 (Colo. 1987). 
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As noted in last year's survey,256 U.S. traders who export or import goods 
should be aware of the Convention on the Limitation Period of the International 
Sale of Goods, 197 4, as amended by a 1980 Protocol. 257 This convention came 
into force on August 1, 1988. The following countries are parties to the 
convention: Argentina, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, 
Hungary, Mexico, Norway, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.258 The United States still 
has taken no formal steps to accede to the convention but a committee of the 
Section of International Law and Practice of the American Bar Association is 
presently studying the convention with a view toward making a recommenda-
tion on whether or not the United States should accede. 
DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 
Under U.C.C. section 7-403(1)(b), "[t]he bailee must deliver goods to a 
person entitled under the document259 ••• unless and to the extent that the bailee 
establishes .... (b) damage to or delay, loss or destruction of the goods for 
which the bailee is not liable, [but the burden of establishing negligence in such 
cases is on the person entitled under the document]." The bracketed language is 
optional and has been enacted by a number of states including Maryland.260 
In Commodities Reserve Corp. v. Belt's Wharf Warehouses, 261 the Maryland 
Court of Appeals in a very thorough opinion considered the effect of the 
optional language. In that case Commodities Reserve ("bailor"), the owner of a 
large quantity of Turkish garbanzo beans, stored them in a warehouse owned 
by Belt's ("warehouseman"). After several months the beans were found to be 
infested with weevils. The bailor brought suit for negligence against the ware-
houseman and the owner of a lot of Mexican garbanzo beans stored in the same 
warehouse and from which the weevils allegedly originated. The case was tried 
before a U.S. magistrate, who applied Maryland law. Under the facts proved, 
the weevils either could have been present in the bailor's Turkish beans when 
they were initially stored or could have infested the Turkish beans from the 
Mexican beans. The magistrate could not say that one cause was more likely 
256. See Frisch & Wladis, supra note 144, at 1302. 
257. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/15 (1974), reprinted in United Nations Conference on 
Prescription (Limitation) in the International Sale of Goods-Official Records 101-05, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.63/16, U.N. Sales No. E.74.V.8 (1975) (text of the limitations convention); U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/18, annex II (1980), reprinted in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods-Official Records 191-92, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97 /19, U.N. Sales No. 
E.82.V.5 (1980) (the 1980 Protocol). 
258. Current information about the status of the convention may be obtained from the Treaty 
Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, New York, New York 10017; (212) 963-
3918. 
259. "Person entitled under the document" is defined in U.C.C. § 7-403(4). 
260. The bracketed language has been enacted in one form or another by 16 states: Arizona, 
California, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming. See R. Anderson, supra note 66, § 
7-403:2. 
261. 529 A.2d 822, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 560 (Md. 1987). 
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than the other. Consequently, he found for the warehouseman. He reasoned 
that under the optional language which Maryland had enacted the bailor had 
the ultimate burden of persuasion on the negligence issue and that it had failed 
to carry that burden. 262 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit certified two questions on burden of proof to 
the Maryland Court of Appeals. 263 The first question asked in pertinent part, 
"what is the burden of proof, if any, resting on each (the bailor and the bailee) 
in establishing the cause of such loss or damage [to stored property]. " 264 The 
Maryland court declared the initial burden to be on the bailor to produce 
evidence supporting a presumption that the warehouseman was negligent. The 
bailor might do this in two ways: (i) show a specific lack of care by the 
warehouseman causing the loss, or (ii) raise a presumption of some unspecified 
negligence by proving delivery of the goods to the warehouseman in good 
condition and failure to return the goods at all or in bad condition. The 
warehouseman might then choose not to put on any case, or more likely as in 
this case, it could defend. This it might do in two ways: (i) show a specific cause 
for the loss which was not the result of the warehouseman's negligence, or (ii) if 
the cause could not be specified but could be reduced to a class of possible 
causes, show that the warehouseman exercised due care to guard against all of 
the possible causes. If the warehouseman has introduced legally sufficient 
evidence of a defense, then the bailor may attempt to rebut that evidence. 
On the facts before it, the Maryland court opined that the bailor had 
produced evidence of negligence, and the warehouseman, evidence of due care. 
The issue was thus submitted to the fact finder to rule which case prevailed. 
This brought the court to the second certified question:265 "As between the 
bailor and the bailee, who carries the ultimate burden of proof when the 
evidence ... is in equipoise?"266 The court held that the optional language 
enacted by Maryland placed the burden of persuasion upon the bailor where it 
alleged negligence. It based this conclusion upon case law, treatises, and the 
subsection's language. One of the commentators cited, Robert Braucher, was in 
a position to know what the optional language was intended to do, because he 
was chairman of the Editorial Board's Subcommittee on Article 7 when the 
262. The magistrate's opinion was oral. His reasoning is described in the opinion of the Fourth 
Circuit on appeal. Commodities Reserve Corp. v. M/S Roumania, 806 F.2d 501, 503-04 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
263. 529 A.2d at 822-23, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 561 (citing 806 F.2d 501). 
264. Id., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 561. 
265. The certified questions concerned burden of proof under§ 7-403(1)(b) only. Presumably 
the bailor also had the initial burden of producing evidence tending to prove that it was a "person 
entitled under the [warehouse receipt covering the goods]," U.C.C. § 7-403(1 ), so that the ware-
houseman had a duty to deliver the stored goods to it. Since this element of the bailor's case was not 
disputed, it was not discussed in any of the courts' opinions. 
266. 529 A.2d at 823, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 562. 
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optional language was added, and he actively participated in the process that led 
to the addition.267 
Thus, in states adopting the optional language in U.C.C. section 7-403(1)(b), 
the bailor who alleges negligent loss or damage to stored goods has the burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the bailee's negligence caused the loss or 
damage. In states not adopting the optional language and in states adopting the 
optional language where the bailor pleads a tort claim other than negligence, the 
bailee would seem to have the burden of persuasion on the tort claim. 
BULK TRANSFERS 
After many years, efforts to improve upon Uniform Commercial Code article 
6 (Bulk Transfers) appear to have reached fruition. 268 At its 1988 annual 
meeting, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
("NCCUSL") withdrew its support for article 6 and encouraged those states 
that have enacted the article to repeal it. 
Recognizing that some legislatures may wish to continue to regulate bulk 
sales, but believing that existing article 6 has become inadequate for that 
purpose, NCCUSL promulgated a revised version of article 6. The revised 
article is designed to afford better protection to creditors while minimizing the 
impediments to good-faith transactions. 
At its meeting in December 1988, the council of the American Law Institute 
("ALI") approved the NCCUSL recommendations and forwarded them to the 
ALI membership for consideration at its meeting in May 1989. 
As approved by NCCUSL, revised article 6 would substantially modify the 
law governing bulk transfers. The following are among the major changes the 
article, if enacted, will make: 
(i) The revised article will apply only when the buyer has notice, or after 
reasonable inquiry would have had notice, that the seller will not continue 
to operate the same or a similar kind of business after the sale. 
267. The optional language first appears in ALI & NCCUSL, 1952 Official Draft of Text and 
Comments of the U.C.C. 46 (Supp. No. 1 Jan. 1955 ), reprinted in 17 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 48, 
at 364. Prior to the printing of that supplement, the Commercial Code Committee of the Pennsylva-
nia State Chamber of Commerce ("Chamber Committee") had submitted to the Editorial Board 
amendments to the U.C.C. The Chamber Committee's article 7 amendments were referred to the 
Editorial Board's Subcommittee on Article 7, which was chaired by Robert Braucher. Professor 
Braucher was to meet with a representative of the Chamber Committee to resolve those amend-
ments. See Letter from H. Goodrich to Members of the Editorial Board (Dec. 15, 1954 ). 
Presumably the optional language resulted from the meeting between Braucher and the Chamber 
Committee's representative. In any event, Braucher was an active participant and was thus in a 
position to know why the optional language was added. 
268. The early steps were taken by a subcommittee of the Uniform Commercial Code Commit-
tee of the ABA's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law. See Hawkland, Proposed 
Revisions to U.C.C. Article 6, 38 Bus. Law. 1729 (1983). In 1985, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in cooperation with the American Law Institute, estab-
lished a drafting committee to revise article 6. See generally Harris, The Article 6 Drafting 
Committee's New Approach to Asset Acquisitions, 42 Bus. Law. 1261 (1987). 
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(ii) The revised article will not apply to sales in which the value of the 
property otherwise available to creditors is less than $10,000 or those in 
which the value of the property is greater than $25,000,000. 
(iii) The choice-of-law provision will limit the applicable law to that of 
one jurisdiction. 
(iv) When the seller is indebted to a large number of persons, the buyer 
will not need to obtain a list of those persons or send individual notices to 
each person but instead will be permitted to give notice by filing. 
(v) The notice period will be increased from ten days to forty-five days, 
and the statute of limitations will be extended from six months to one year. 
(vi) The required notice will include a copy of a "schedule of distribu-
tion," setting forth how the net contract price is to be distributed. 
(vii) A buyer who makes a good faith effort to comply with the 
requirements of the revised article or to exclude the sale from the applica-
tion of the article-or who acts on the good faith belief that the article does 
not apply to the sale-will not be liable for noncompliance. 
(viii) A buyer's noncompliance will not render the sale ineffective or 
otherwise affect the buyer's title to the goods; rather, the liability of a 
noncomplying buyer will be for damages caused by the noncompliance. 
In addition to making these and other major substantive changes, enactment 
of revised article 6 should resolve many of the ambiguities that three decades of 
law practice, judicial construction, and scholarly inquiry have disclosed. 
One of the issues addressed in the revised article is whether the failure to give 
notice of an impending sale should toll the statute of limitations. Section 6-111 
of the existing article tolls the normal six-month statute of limitations269 if the 
bulk transfer "has been concealed." Some cases, including one decided during 
the survey period,270 hold that failure to give notice of an impending bulk 
transfer constitutes concealment. Others consider the failure to give notice to be 
insufficient to toll the statute. They hold that a transfer is not "concealed" 
unless an affirmative act has been taken to shield the transfer from the 
creditor.271 Revised article 6 adopts the latter approach and provides expressly 
that complete noncompliance with the requirements of the article does not of 
itself constitute concealment. 
Existing article 6 imposes a number of risks that may not be readily apparent 
to buyers of business assets. The transactions in Nichols Motorcycle Supply v. 
269. The statute of limitations applies to an "action under this Article." U.C.C. § 6-111. The 
court in Tisdall v. Tisdall, 422 N.W.2d 105, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 818 (S.D. 1988), 
held that this limitation is inapplicable to an action by a transferee in bulk against its agent for 
damages caused by the agent's failure to conduct the bulk transfer in accordance with the 
requirements of article 6. 
270. Seminole Motors, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust. Co. (In re Seminole Motors, 
Inc.), 86 Bankr. 245, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1092 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1987). 
271. See, e.g., Pipeline Materials, Inc. v. Turf Irrigation Corp., 754 P.2d 775, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1094 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). 
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Regency Kawasaki, Inc. 212 indicate one of those risks. A motorcycle dealer 
sought to liquidate its business as follows. It transferred all its new motorcycles, 
having a value of $200,000, to the manufacturer in satisfaction of a secured 
debt. Thereafter, another dealer bought $30,000 of used and junk motorcycles, 
parts, and accessories, leaving the seller with $20,000 of inventory and equip-
ment remaining. The court held that the sale to the dealer constituted the 
transfer of a "major part" of the inventory and was a bulk transfer under article 
6.273 Because the buyer failed to comply with the requirements of sections 
6-104(1)(a) and (b), the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the sale be 
set aside. 
In determining whether the buyer bought a "major part" of the inventory, the 
court rejected the view that the buyer's portion should be measured against the 
total inventory held by the seller at the time it began to liquidate. Rather, the 
value of the inventory previously taken by the secured party was not to be 
included in the calculation. The moral of the story is clear: Each buyer at a self-
liquidation should take care to determine how much inventory is "held" by the 
seller at the time of the sale to that buyer. Under the court's ruling, more than 
one bulk transfer may occur in the course of a self-liquidation. Moreover, the 
buyer of the inventory remaining at the end of a close-out sale will be required 
to comply with the requirements of article 6, regardless of the relationship 
between the value of the inventory purchased and the value of the inventory 
when the seller's business was a going concern. The result is likely to be the 
same under revised article 6. 
Another risk lurking in article 6 may arise from the use of the "short-form" 
notice in section 6-107(1 ). In Cullen Distributing, Inc. v. Petty,274 the transferee 
knew that the proceeds of the sale would be paid entirely to secured parties 
secured by the property transferred.275 Nevertheless, the transferee sent "short-
form" notices stating that "[a]ll debts ... will be paid in full ... as a result of 
this transaction . . . ."276 The transferee did so based on the transferor's 
representation that he would pay his creditors from other funds. The court 
affirmed a judgment against the transferee and in favor of one of the transferor's 
creditors in the full amount of the creditor's claim against the transferor. The 
court found that, although the facts did not support application of a third party 
beneficiary theory, the trial court's finding for the creditor on the issue of 
promissory estoppel was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
272. 295 S.C. 138, 367 S.E.2d 438, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 823 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1988). 
273. The court held this transfer to be excluded from article 6 by § 6-103(3 ), which excludes 
"[t)ransfers in settlement or realization of a lien or other security interests." 
274. 164 Ill. App. 3d 313, 517 N.E.2d 733, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1081 (1987). 
275. Query whether the transfer was excepted from article 6 by virtue of§ 6-103(3). 
276. 164 Ill. App. 3d at 314, 517 N.E.2d at 734, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 
1082-83. 
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Of even greater concern to transferees in bulk is the opinion of Justice Lund, 
specially concurring.217 By construing article 6 as imposing guarantor liability 
upon every transferee who uses the "short form" in favor of every creditor 
shown on the transferor's list, he would eliminate any need to determine 
whether the elements of promissory estoppel were met in each case. In contrast, 
Presiding Justice Green, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have 
relied exclusively on promissory estoppel and would have reversed the judgment 
insofar as it awarded money damages for violation of article 6. 278 To avoid 
liability, the transferee should have used the "long-form" notice described in 
sections 6-107(1) and (2) and indicated doubt over whether the transferor's 
debts would be paid. 
Revised article 6 eliminates the distinction between the "short form" and 
"long form" and contains a form of notice sufficient to meet the statutory 
requirements. 
277. Id. at 323, 517 N.E.2d at 740, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1090 (Lund, J., 
specially concurring). 
278. Id. at 324, 517 N.E.2d at 741, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1091 (Green, P.J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 

Article 2A-Leases 
By Lawrence F. Flick JI* 
Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code,1 in its first full year after 
approval by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
("NCCUSL"), the American Law Institute, and the Permanent Editorial 
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, has already been enacted in Okla-
homa2 and California.3 Legislation to adopt article 2A is under consideration in 
at least twenty other states.4 
As expected for a new statute, 1988 saw no reported cases involving article 
2A, but the new article has been the subject of a number of law review articles.5 
•Mr. Flick, a member of the New Jersey and Pennsylvania bars, practices law with Blank, Rome, 
Comisky & McCauley in Philadelphia. He is chairperson of the Pennsylvania Bar Association's 
Article 2A Task Force. 
I. All references to "article 2A" and the "official text" mean the 1987 Official Text of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
2. Oklahoma's version of article 2A was enacted March 30, 1988, and became effective 
November 1, 1988. The statute is codified at Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, §§ 2A-101 to -531 (Supp. 1988). 
See Miller, Puckett & Suggs, Leases in Oklahoma: The New Rules, 41 Okla. L. Rev. 417 (1988). 
3. California's version of article 2A was enacted on September 16, 1988, and will become 
effective January 1, 1990. The statute is codified at Cal. Com. Code§§ 10101-10532 (West Supp. 
1989). 
4. Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. Also in 1988, article 2A was approved by the Delaware 
House but failed to pass the Senate; it was withdrawn for further consideration in Connecticut. 
Several other states intend to introduce article 2A in 1989 and are currently studying the statute. In 
August 1988, the American Bar Association approved article 2A but recognized in its resolution that 
due consideration would be given during the enactment process to divergent views as in the case of 
amendments proposed by the California Commission on Uniform State Laws. 
5. Article 2A was the subject of coverage in this Annual Survey last year. Bayer, Personal 
Property Leasing: Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 43 Bus. Law. 1491 (1988). See also 
Symposium: Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 559 (1988); Cooper, 
Personal Property Leasing Under Article 2A, in Equipment Leasing-Leveraged Leasing 1047 
(Practising Law Institute 1988); Naples, A Review and Analysis of the New Article 2A-Leases 
Amendment to the UCC and Its Impact on Secured Creditors, Equipment and Finance Lessors, 93 
Com. L.J. 342 (1988); Herbert, A Draft Too Soon: Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 93 
Com. L.J. 413 ( 1988); Miller, Puckett & Suggs, Leases of Goods in Oklahoma: The New Rules, 41 
Okla. L. Rev. 417 ( 1988); Comment, Security Interests under Article 2A: More Confusion in the 
Leasing Arena, 18 Stetson L. Rev. 69 ( 1988); Note, Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2A-Leases: 
Structuring Priorities of Competing Claimants to Leased Property, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 208 ( 1988). 
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While most of the commentators view article 2A favorably and support its 
adoption by the individual states, many have pointed out various glitches in the 
statute and have been critical of specific provisions.6 In response to a number of 
these criticisms and others raised by leasing industry trade groups and members 
of the bar, California adopted a version of article 2A containing a number of 
nonuniform amendments to the official text of article 2A ("California 2A").7 
The California nonuniform amendments were by far the most significant 
development affecting article 2A in 1988 and are likely to provoke thought and 
controversy in other state legislatures considering adoption of article 2A. The 
Massachusetts legislature, for example, is presently considering a version of 
article 2A that contains a number of revisions based on California 2A.8 
The California nonuniform amendments resulted primarily from the efforts 
of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Business Law Section of the 
State Bar of California and lobbying efforts by equipment lessors and trade 
groups located in California. That bar committee studied article 2A and issued a 
detailed report recommending amendments to several sections of the uniform 
law ("California Bar Report").9 In response to the enactment of California 2A 
and efforts to introduce similar nonuniform amendments in other states, the 
Standby Committee on Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, appointed by 
NCCUSL, reviewed the nonuniform amendments enacted in California 2A and 
responded with a detailed report entitled The California Amendments to UCC 
Article 2A ("Standby Committee Report"). 10 The Standby Committee Report 
urges those states considering article 2A to reject the California nonuniform 
6. See, e.g., Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in Lessors' Remedies Under Article 2A: Using 
Official Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 875, 876 (1988) ("Despite the 
difficulties in interpreting and applying Article 2A ... , the statute represents a significant improve-
ment over the present state of uncertainty and confusion that marks personal property leasing law"); 
Akes, Surreptitious and Not-So-Surreptitious Adjustment of the UCC: An Introductory Essay, 39 
Ala. L. Rev. 559, 573 (1988) ("Most of the other contributors to this symposium ... are generally 
favorable in their assessment of Article 2A's provisions and qualify their criticisms with remarks 
praising the overall quality of the effort."); Benfield, Lessor's Damages Under Article 2A After 
Default by the Lessee As to Accepted Goods, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 915, 956 (1988) ("The glitches in the 
statute and the unresolved questions [concerning lessor's remedies J are not by any means sufficient 
to raise serious questions about whether Article 2A should be adopted."). But see Herbert, supra 
note 5, at 414 (criticizing article 2A for its failure to deal with the problem of ostensible ownership 
by the lessee and with the special problems created by consumer leasing and for poor draftsman-
ship.); Kripke, Some Dissonant Notes About Article 2A, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 791, 801 (1988) (opposing 
promulgation of article 2A). 
7. Cal. Com. Code §§ 10101-10532. Oklahoma has enacted article 2A with only minor 
amendments, which mostly reflect differences in Oklahoma law. See supra notes 2-3 and accompa-
nying text. 
8. Mass. H.R. 6269 (1988) [hereinafter Massachusetts Bill]. 
9. California State Bar Report, reprinted in 39 Ala. L. Rev. 979 (1988). 
10. NCCUSL, The California Amendments to UCC Article 2A (1989) [hereinafter Standby 
Committee Report]. A copy of the report may be obtained from the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1706, Chicago, Illinois 
60611. 
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amendments; it recommends that the official text of article 2A be introduced and 
enacted. 11 
This survey will highlight some of the significant differences between the 
official text of article 2A and California 2A and will summarize the debate 
between the proponents of the competing versions of the statute. 12 
DEFINITION OF FINANCE LEASE 
Article 2A contains a number of special statutory provisions which benefit a 
lessor under a "finance lease."13 If a lease qualifies as a finance lease under 
article 2A, the lessor is automatically given the benefit of a statutory equivalent 
of a "hell-or-high-water" clause14 and does not give any of the implied warran-
ties provided in article 2A other than an implied warranty of quiet enjoyment. 16 
In addition, the lessee under a finance lease automatically becomes the benefi-
ciary of all warranties made in the underlying supply contract for the leased 
property. 16 Article 2A defines a "finance lease" as: 
[A] lease in which (i) the lessor does not select, manufacture or supply the 
goods, (ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the right to possession and use of 
the goods in connection with the lease, and (iii) either the lessee receives a 
copy of the contract evidencing the lessor's purchase of the goods on or 
before signing the lease contract, or the lessee's approval of the contract 
evidencing the lessor's purchase of the goods is a condition to effectiveness 
of the lease contract. 17 
Based on concerns expressed by some equipment lessors that it is neither 
feasible nor desirable in some transactions to supply the lessee with a copy of the 
supply contract, California 2A expands the ways in which a lessor can have its 
lease qualify as a statutory finance lease. 18 Under California 2A a lease also 
qualifies as a finance lease if the lease contract discloses all warranties provided 
11. In response to the Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, Donald J. Rapson and Harry 
C. Sigman authored a section by section analysis of the nonuniform amendments adopted in 
California and introduced in the Massachusetts Bill. D. Rapson & H. Sigman, Reasons for 
Revisions (as set forth in mark-up dated January 24, 1989 of Mass. H.R. 6269) (Feb. 23, 1989) 
(hereinafter Reasons for Revisions]. 
12. This survey will not discuss amendments in California's article 2A that are local in nature, 
reflect differences in existing California law, or are merely stylistic. 
13. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2A-209(2), 2A-212(1), 2A-213, 2A-219(1), 2A-220(t)(a), 2A-221, 
2A-405(c), 2A-407, 2A-516(2), 2A-517(1)(a). 
14. Id. § 2A-407. The phrase refers to the fact that under this section-as under contract clauses 
to the same effect-the lessee's obligations to the lessor under a three-party "finance lease" become 
"irrevocable and independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods." Id. 
15. Id. §§ 2A-211(2) (warranty against infringement), 2A-212(1) (warranty of merchantabil-
ity), 2A-213 (warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). 
16. Id.§ 2A-209(1). 
17. Id.§ 2A-103(1)(g). 
18. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 2. The lessor might not want to disclose to the 
lessee a favorable price or other terms negotiated with the supplier of the goods. Also, there may be 
instances where there is no written supply contract. 
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in the supply contract, or if the lessor informs the lessee in wntmg of the 
identity of the supplier and of the fact that the lessee may have rights under the 
supply contract, and advises the lessee to contact the supplier for a description of 
such rights. 19 
The Standby Committee Report takes the position that this California 
nonuniform amendment is unnecessary and that a lessor can obtain the benefits 
of statutory finance lease status by adequately disclaiming warranties and 
including a typical hell-or-high-water clause in the lease. As the Standby 
Committee Report further points out, even a lease transaction involving an oral 
supply contract, if approved by the lessee, can qualify as a "finance lease."20 
The Massachusetts bill contains a further refinement of the California 2A 
definition of a finance lease. This would permit the lessor to qualify its lease as 
a finance lease by directing the lessee to the supplier, but only if the lease is not 
a consumer lease and the appropriate information is provided to the lessee on or 
before the date the lease contract is signed. 21 
A second nonuniform amendment relating to finance leases is found in 
California section 2A-407(3).22 This California amendment is intended to make 
clear that the limited statutory hell-or-high-water provision contained in section 
2A-407(3) does not in any way limit the validity of a contractual hell-or-high-
water clause in the lease contract under other applicable law. 23 The Standby 
Committee Report's response to this amendment is that "this dubious concern is 
19. California's version of§ 2A-103(1)(g) qualifies a lease as a "finance lease" where: 
(iii) either (A) the lessee receives a copy of the contract evidencing the lessor's purchase of the 
goods on or before signing the lease contract, (B) the lessee's approval of the contract evidencing 
the lessor's purchase of the goods is a condition to effectiveness of the lease contract, (C) the 
lessor (aa) informs the lessee in writing of the identity of the supplier unless the lessee has 
selected the supplier and directed the lessor to purchase the goods from the supplier, (bb) 
informs the lessee in writing that the lessee may have rights under the contract evidencing the 
lessor's purchase of the goods, and (cc) advises the lessee in writing to contact the supplier for a 
description of any such rights, or (D) the lease contract discloses all warranties and other rights 
provided to the lessee by the lessor and supplier in connection with the lease contract and 
informs the lessee that there are no warranties or other rights provided to the lessee by the 
lessor and supplier other than those disclosed in the lease contract. 
Cal. Com. Code§ 10103(1)(g) (West Supp. 1989). 
20. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 3. The California Bar Report agrees that a 
lessor could obtain satisfactory protection by contractually providing for the benefits of a statutory 
"finance lease." California Bar Report, supra note 9, at 997. 
21. The Massachusetts Bill provides that a lease qualifies as a "finance lease": 
(D) only if the lease is not a consumer lease, on or before the signing of the lease contract by the 
lessee the lessor (aa) informs the lessee in writing of the identity of the supplier unless the 
lessee has selected the supplier and directed the lessor to purchase the goods from the supplier, 
(bb) informs the lessee in writing that the lessee may have rights under the contract evidencing 
the lessor's purchase of the goods, and (cc) advises the lessee in writing to contact the supplier 
for a description of any such rights. 
22. Cal. Com. Code§ 10407(3) (West Supp. 1989). 
23. The added subsection provides: 
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laid to rest by the Comment to Section 2A-407; the California amendment 
simply codifies the Comment."24 
TRANSFER OF LESSOR'S INTEREST 
Article 2A permits either party to a lease to transfer its interest under the 
lease contract, including the lessor's residual interest in the leased property.25 
There are two exceptions to this general rule on free alienability. The first, 
contained in section 2A-303( 1 )(a), prohibits voluntary transfers if the lease 
contract prohibits such a transfer. 26 The second, found in section 2A-303( 1 )(b), 
prohibits both voluntary and involuntary transfers if (i) the transfer materially 
changes the duty of or materially increases the other party's burden of risk, and 
(ii) the other party to the lease has made a timely demand for cure or adequate 
assurances of performance and such cure or assurances are not provided. 27 
Questions have been raised as to the wisdom of imposing such a restraint on the 
free alienability of the lessor's interest under the lease and the lessor's residual 
interest in the leased property, because such a restraint could affect the lessor's 
ability to obtain secured financing. 28 These concerns gave rise to nonuniform 
amendments to section 2A-303 in California.29 
Under California 2A, an attempt to prohibit the transfer of the lessor's 
interest under a lease or of the lessor's residual interest in the leased property 
does not invalidate the creation and enforcement of any security interest granted 
by the lessor.30 The Standby Committee Report, responding to this amendment, 
points out that official section 2A-303 already recognizes that a lessee has an 
interest in controlling the identity of the lessor who may be obligated to render 
Id. 
(3) This section shall not affect the validity under any other law of a covenant in any lease 
contract making the lessee's promises irrevocable and independent upon the lessee's acceptance 
of the goods. 
24. See Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 10. The comment to § ZA-407 states, 
"This section is silent as to whether a 'hell-or-high-water' clause, i.e., a clause that is to the effect of 
this Section, is enforceable if included in a finance lease that is a consumer lease or a lease that is not 
a finance lease. That issue will continue to be determined by the facts of each case." U.C.C. § 2A-
407 official comment. One commentator has suggested that the comments to § 2A-407 on this issue 
are "not merely ambiguous; they are internally self-contradictory." Herbert, supra note 5, at 461 
(reference is to another part of the comments, which states that § 2A-407 "excludes a finance lease 
that is a consumer lease. That a consumer be obligated to pay notwithstanding defective goods or the 
like is a principle that is not tenable under case law .. ., state statute .. ., or federal statute."). 
25. U.C.C. § 2A-303(1). 
26. Id.§ 2A-303(1)(a). Subsection (7) of§ 2A-303 requires that any prohibition on the transfer 
of an interest of a party under the lease be specific, in writing, and conspicuous. 
27. Id.§ 2A-303(1)(b). 
28. Harris, The Rights of Creditors Under Article 2A, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 803, 843-44, 849-50 
(1988); Miller, Puckett & Suggs, supra note 2, at 436-37; Bayer, supra note 5, at 1491, 1506. 
29. California has also revised U.C.C. § 9-318(4) to make it clear that a term in a contract 
prohibiting or requiring consent to the creation of a security interest in chattel paper is ineffective. 
Cal. Com. Code§ 9318 (West Supp. 1989). 
30. Id.§ 10303(3)(a) (West Supp. 1989). See Reasons for Revisions, supra note 11, at 3. 
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substantial performance affecting the value of the lease, and that the lessor can 
address its concerns in the lease contract.31 The California amendments, recog-
nizing that a sale of the residual interest upon the lessor's default might create a 
significant burden for the lessee, retain the restraint on alienability found in 
official section 2A-303(1)(b), where the transfer is the result of a sale under 
sections 9-504 or 9-505 of the Uniform Commercial Code.32 
Finally, California 2A adds a new subsection to section 2A-303. This 
expressly provides that the restraints on alienability found in section 
2A-303(1)(b) do not affect the validity of any provision in the lease obligating 
the lessee to keep its interest in the lease or the leased property free of liens and 
encumbrances. 33 
RIGHTS OF CREDITOR TRANSFEREES 
Section 2A-307 provides that a creditor of a lessor takes subject to the lease 
contract unless (i) the creditor has a lien that attached to the leased property 
prior to the time the lease became enforceable against the lessee or (ii) the 
creditor has obtained a security interest in the leased property that would have 
priority over a competing security interest in the same leased property perfected 
under article 9 at the time the lease became enforceable against the lessee.34 In 
any event, a lessee in the ordinary course of business will generally take the 
leased property free of any security interest created by the lessor.35 
Commentators have criticized the rule in section 2A-307(2)(b) that resolves 
priority disputes between a secured creditor of the lessor and a lessee not in the 
ordinary course of business by reference to a "hypothetical secured party" test. 36 
The main criticism is that treatment of the interest of a lessee not in the 
ordinary course of business under section 2A-307(2)(b) is inconsistent with the 
result reached for a buyer not in the ordinary course of business under article 9. 
Section 9-301(1)(c) provides that a buyer not in the ordinary course of business 
takes free of an unperfected security interest if the buyer takes delivery and 
31. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 3, 4 (citing Harris, supra note 28, at 855). As 
one example of a situation where the identity of the lessor is extremely important to the lessee, 
Professor Harris points out that the sale of a lessor's residual interest in an aircraft after default to a 
foreign entity could render the aircraft ineligible for registration and thus unusable by the lessee. 
Harris, supra note 28, at 853. 
32. Reasons for Revisions, supra note 11, at 3. 
33. Cal. Com. Code § 10303(3)(d) (West Supp. 1989). Proponents of California's 
§ 2A-303(3)(d) have expressed a concern that "2A-303(1)(b) is otherwise not clear as to the 
effectiveness of such a provision where there is an involuntary transfer of the lessee's interest, e.g., 
levy and execution sale by a judgment creditor of the lessee." Reasons for Revisions, supra note 11, 
at 4. The Standby Committee Report recognizes and agrees that § 2A-303( 1) is not explicit on the 
issue of whether seizure of the lessee's interest under the lease can be made an event of default, but 
the report points out that nothing expressly states that it cannot be made a default. The Standby 
Committee Report also agrees that California 2A correctly states the result that should be reached 
under the official text. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 10. 
34. U.C.C. § 2A-307(2). 
35. Id. § 2A-307(3). 
36. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 28, at 818-20. 
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gives value without knowledge of the security interest.37 Under official article 
2A, however, the lessee's knowledge of the security interest created by the lessor 
is not relevant in determining priorities. 
California 2A replaces the "hypothetical secured party" rule with a test that 
is consistent with article 9. It provides that the secured party will have priority 
unless the lessee gives value and takes possession of the leased property without 
knowledge of the security interest.38 The Standby Committee Report says that 
the California amendments may prove unfair to certain lessees, for example a 
lessee who has leased equipment subject to a purchase money security interest 
which is not perfected at the time the lessee entered into the lease and took 
possession of the leased property, but is perfected within twenty days after 
either the lessor or lessee receives possession of the leased property.39 Under the 
official text, the lessee in this example would take free of the purchase money 
security interest even if the lease was not in the ordinary course of business. 
Under the variation in California 2A, if the lease is not in the ordinary course of 
business, the lessee will take subject to the purchase money security interest. 
DEFAULT 
Article 2A contains a number of statutory defaults, including nondelivery, 
wrongful rejection or revocation of acceptance, failure to make payment when 
due, and repudiation. 40 Sections 2A-508 and 2A-523 list specific remedies that 
the aggrieved lessee or lessor may exercise upon the occurrence of one of these 
statutory defaults. 41 Section 2A-523(2) provides that "if a lessee is otherwise in 
default under a lease contract, the lessor may exercise the rights and remedies 
37. U.C.C. § 9-301( I )(c). 
38. California's § 2A-307(2) provides that a creditor or the lessor takes subject to the lease 
contract: 
(a) Unless the creditor holds a lien that attached to the goods before the lease contract became 
enforceable; 
(b) Unless the creditor holds a security interest in the goods and the lessee did not give value 
and receive delivery or the goods without knowledge or the security interest; or 
(c) Unless the creditor holds a security interest in the goods that attached and was perfected 
before (i) the lease contract became enforceable, (ii) the lessee gave value and received delivery 
or the goods, or (iii) in the case or a purchase money security interest, the date that is 20 days 
after the date that the lessor received possession of the goods or the date that the lessee received 
possession of the goods, whichever is earlier. 
Cal. Com. Code§ 10307 (West Supp. 1989). 
39. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 4. 
40. U.C.C. §§ 2A-508, 2A-523. 
41. A lessee's remedies upon the occurrence of a statutory default by the lessor include the right 
to cancel the lease, the right to recover any rent and security deposits paid, the right to cover and 
recover damages, the right to recover goods identified to the contract and, in proper cases, the right 
to obtain specific performance or replevy of the goods. Id. §§ 2A-508, 2A-509, 2A-505, 2A-518 to 
-522. The lessor's remedies upon the occurrence of a statutory default by the lessee include the right 
to cancel the lease contract, the right to proceed with respect to goods not identified to the lease 
contract, the right to withhold delivery of goods and to take possession of goods previously delivered, 
the right to stoppage in transit, the right to dispose of goods and recover damages, the right to retain 
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provided in the lease contract and this Article."42 A corresponding provision is 
found in section 2A-508 with respect to the lessee's rights against a defaulting 
lessor.43 
The California Bar Report points out that these subsections are misleading in 
their use of the term "otherwise in default" and suggests that the statutory 
remedies provided in part 5 of article 2A should be available following any 
default agreed to in the lease. 44 There is also disagreement as to whether a party 
to a lease may provide in the lease contract that all of the remedies of article 2A 
apply upon the occurrence of any default in the lease contract, or whether the 
lease must expressly state the remedies that apply to a default that is not a 
statutory default. 45 
California 2A does not articulate the California Bar Report's suggestion that 
the remedies in part 5 should apply to all defaults; instead it was modified to 
make clearer that the statutory remedies in part 5 of article 2A are only 
available for the statutory defaults defined in subsection ( 1) of both sections 
2A-508 and ZA-523, but that they can also be made applicable by agreement to 
other contractual defaults.46 The Massachusetts bill has followed the original 
suggestion in the California Bar Report, providing that the statutory rights and 
remedies provided for in article 2A are available for any default contractually 
provided for in the lease unless the lease otherwise provides. This would enable 
the lessee or lessor simply to incorporate by reference all of the rights and 
remedies of article 2A. 47 
REMEDIES AND DAMAGES 
One of the primary original reasons for drafting a uniform personal property 
act was to clarify the confusing and often conflicting treatment that various 
courts gave lessor remedies and damages upon the lessee's default. 48 While there 
is a virtual consensus that the remedy and damage provisions in part 5 of article 
2A are a vast improvement over the prior state of the law,49 the provisions 
the goods and recover damages, or in a proper case, the right to recover accelerated rent. Id. 
§§ 2A-523 to -531, 2A-505. 
42. Id. § 2A-523(2). 
43. Id. § 2A-508(2). 
44. California Bar Report, supra note 9, at 1036. 
45. Benfield, supra note 6, at 917 n.9; Herbert, supra note 5, at 439--41. 
46. Cal. Com. Code§ 10523 (West Supp. 1989). 
4 7. Reasons for Revisions, supra note 11, at 6, 8. 
48. Mooney, Personal Property leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus. Law. 1605, 1615 (1981) 
("Existing law dealing (and failing to deal) with the nonbankruptcy enforcement of leases of 
personal property, and the available remedies and damages upon the lessee's breach, may be the 
area most in need of the therapeutic effects of uniform statutory treatment."); Boss, Panacea or 
Nightmare? leases in Article 2, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 39, 78 (1984); Huddleson, Old Wine in New 
Bottles: UCC Article 2A-leases, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 615, 641 (1988). 
49. See, e.g., Miller, Puckett & Suggs, supra note 2, at 440 ("Perhaps Article 2A's greatest 
contribution to Oklahoma law concerns remedies."); Benfield, supra note 6, at 956 ("The Article 2A 
provisions as to the lessor's remedies on the lessee's breach are sufficiently varied and flexible, 
particularly when subjected to the Code's overriding doctrines of good faith, that courts should be 
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dealing with lessor remedies and damages have been the brunt of much of the 
criticism directed at article 2A. 50 Some of the criticism of the article 2A 
provisions on remedies and damages is attributable to the drafters' decision to 
follow the remedy and damage provisions of article 2 (Sales) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.51 The Drafting Committee tried to address many of these 
criticisms in a revised set of official comments to article 2A. 52 However, concern 
remained that such efforts to clarify the text of the statute through the use of 
official comments are inappropriate. 53 In response to these criticisms of the 
lessor remedy and damage provisions in article 2A and to recommendations in 
the California Bar Report,54 California enacted nonuniform versions of sections 
2A-527, 2A-528, and 2A-529.55 
The official text provides that the lessor, after a statutory default, may dispose 
of the leased goods by lease, sale, or otherwise.56 If the lessor repossesses the 
goods and re-leases them under an agreement substantially similar to the 
original lease,57 section 2A-527 provides that the lessor may recover the sum of . 
(i) accrued but unpaid rent, as of the date of default; (ii) the present value, as of 
the date of default, of the difference between the total remaining rent payments 
due under the lease and the total rent payable under the substantially similar 
lease; and (iii) any incidental damages resulting from the lessee's default, less 
any expenses saved in consequence of the default. 58 If the lessor repossesses the 
able to reach fair and predictable results."); Naples, supra note S, at 3S3 ("the Article 2A committee 
took special note of not only the dissatisfaction which lessors have characteristically displayed with 
regard to the remedies available to them in the event of a lessee's default but also of how such 
remedies might be enforced by a lessor given the history of judicial inconsistency in the remedies 
area"). 
SO. See, e.g., Herbert, supra note S, at 463 (article 2A "remedy provisions are disastrously ill-
coordinated"); California Bar Report, supra note 9, at 103S-4S; Reasons for Revisions, supra note 
11, at 9-13; Kripke, supra note 6, at 79S-97; Rapson, supra note 6, at 887; Benfield, supra note 6, 
at 79S. 
SI. See, e.g., Kripke, supra note 6, at 79S ("desire to follow Article 2 muddles § 2A-S29 on the 
lessor's right to sue for rent"); Rapson, supra note 6, at 887 ("by replicating the structure and 
formulation of the Article 2 remedies .. ., Article 2A has created interpretative problems ... "). 
S2. Rapson, supra note 6, at 880. 
S3. Id. at 877-79, 912; Kripke, supra note 6, at 796 ("a defect or ambiguity in the statute should 
be cured in the statute, not by writing Official Comments which are neither formally adopted by the 
two sponsor organizations nor enacted by legislatures"); California Bar Report, supra note 9, at 984 
(" 'legislation by comment' is not only inappropriate but also, in this case, unlikely to be success-
ful"). 
S4. California Bar Report, supra note 9, at 984-8S, 1036-43. 
SS. Cal. Com. Code§§ IOS27-10S29 (West Supp. 1989). Corresponding revisions were made to 
§§ 2A-S08 and 2A-S 19 dealing with a lessee's remedies upon the lessor's default. Id. §§ 1 OS08, 
10S19. 
S6. U.C.C. § 2A-S27. 
S7. Provided the new lease agreement is entered into in good faith and in a commercially 
reasonable manner. U.C.C. § 2A-S27 does not provide an absolute rule as to when a new lease 
should be considered substantially similar to the original lease. The official comment to the section 
describes some of the factors that should be considered but leaves the decision to the courts for 
determination on a case by case basis. 
S8. U.C.C. § 2A-S27. 
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goods and disposes of them in any manner other than by re-lease under a 
substantially similar agreement, then section 2A-528 provides that the lessor 
may recover the sum of (i) accrued but unpaid rent, as of the date of default; (ii) 
the present value, as of the date of default, of the difference between the total 
remaining rent payments due under the lease and the "market rent" for the 
same period; and (iii) any incidental damages resulting from the lessee's default 
less any expenses saved in consequence of the dcfault. 59 
The sections of the statute which specify damages as of the date of default 
have been criticized for being unfair to the lessor because there will likely be a 
gap between the date of default and the date the lessor obtains possession of the 
goods and is able to dispose of them.60 Under article 2A, during this gap period 
the lessor would not be able to recover the agreed upon rent but would only be 
entitled to the present value of the difference between the remaining rental 
payments and (depending on whether section 2A-527 or section 2A-528 is 
applicable) either the total rent under the new lease or the "market rent." 
In response to this criticism, California 2A provides that damages are 
determined "as of the date of the commencement of the term of the new lease 
agreement" where the lessor has elected to re-lease the goods under a substan-
tially similar lease,61 and "as of the date the lessor obtained possession of the 
goods or such earlier date as the lessee has made an effective tender of possession 
of the goods back to the lessor" where the lessor has elected to dispose of the 
goods by some other means.62 The Standby Committee Report expresses con-
cern that these California variations permit the lessor to benefit from delay.63 
The Reasons for Revisions respond by pointing out that if the lessor delays in 
repossessing the goods under California section 2A-507, the substitute lease will 
not be made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, and that 
under California section 2A-508 the lessee can tender possession of the goods 
back to the lessor at an earlier date, thus fixing the date used to determine 
damages.64 The Standby Committee Report also minimizes these concerns 
because under "well defined law" outside of article 2A, the lessee would be liable 
for losses due to the delay.65 
59. Id. § 2A-528. 
60. See, e.g., Rapson, supra note 6, at 895-96, 911; California Bar Report, supra note 9, at 
1039; Herbert, supra note 5, at 452. 
61. Cal. Com. Code§ 10527(2) (West Supp. 1989). 
62. Id.§ 10528(1). California's§ 2A-528(1) also provides that "market rent" is determined as of 
the date the lessor obtains possession of the goods or such earlier date as the lessee tenders possession 
of the goods back to the lessor "and at the place where the goods were located on that date." Id. The 
official text provides that "market rent" is determined "at the time and place for tender." U.C.C. 
§ 2A-528( 1 ). Commentators have pointed out that the official text is not clear, unless read in 
conjunction with the comments. See, e.g., Benfield, supra note 6, at 932-34. The Standby Commit-
tee Report states that this California nonuniform amendment "essentially codifies the comments to 
the section." Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 11. 
63. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 5. 
64. Reasons for Revisions, supra note 11, at 9-10. 
65. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 5; Miller, Puckett & Suggs, supra note 2, at 
444-45. The authors state that "under established law outside of Article 2A the lessee will be liable 
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Commentators have criticized article 2A for being unclear as to whether the 
damage formula in section 2A-527 is simply an alternative to that in section 
2A-528 where the goods are re-leased under a "substantially similar" lease.66 
California 2A clarifies that where a lessor has chosen to re-lease the goods 
under a "substantially similar" lease agreement, that lessor may elect to recover 
damages either under the "market rent" rule in section 2A-528, or based on the 
rent from the substantially similar lease under section 2A-527. 67 The Standby 
Committee Report finds that the statute and the comments to sections 2A-527, 
2A-528, and 2A-523 "strongly support" the interpretation that the lessor may 
use either section, but the report goes on to state that, by putting this directly in 
the statute, California 2A creates "inflexibility" which "could do more harm 
than good. "68 
Section 2A-528(2) provides an alternative measure of damages where the 
measure provided in section 2A-528(1) is "inadequate to put the lessor in as 
good a position as performance would have."69 A lessor that qualifies under this 
section is entitled to lost profits, including overhead, reduced by payments and 
proceeds of any disposition of the leased property. 70 Although the comment to 
the section makes it clear that the concept of present value should be applied in 
calculating profit,71 commentators have been critical of the failure of the statute 
itself to so provide.72 California 2A addresses this concern by expressly provid-
ing that the lessor is only entitled to the "present value of the profit."73 
In some cases where the lessor elects to retain the goods for the remainder of 
the lease term rather than dispose of them, official section 2A-529 provides that 
the lessor may recover the sum of (i) accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of 
default, (ii) the present value of the remaining lease payments as of the date of 
default, and (iii) any incidental damages resulting from the lessee's default, less 
for any loss due to the delay, and such would appear to qualify as an example of incidental damages 
which the lessor may recover." Id. The Standby Committee Report also cites to the comment to 
§ 2A-505, which provides that "principles of law and equity with respect to the protection of [the 
lessor's reversion of any interest in the goods] ... apply in many instances, e.g., refusal of the lessee 
to return goods to the lessor after termination or cancellation of the lease." Standby Committee 
Report, supra note 10, at 5. Proponents of California 2A have expressed concern that the correct 
interpretation of the text of§ 2A-527(2) should not require reliance on the comment to § 2A-525. 
Reasons for Revisions, supra note 11, at 9. 
66. See, e.g., Rapson, supra note 6, at 898 n.73. 
67. Cal. Com. Code§§ 10527(3), 10528(1) (West Supp. 1989). 
68. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 11 (citing J. White & R. Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code 271-73 (2d ed. 1980)). 
69. U.C.C. § 2A-528(2). The section is modeled after U.C.C. § l-708(2) applicable to "lost 
volume sellers." Id. § 2A-528 comment. 
70. Id. § 2A-528{2). 
71. Id. § 2A-528(2) comment. 
72. Herbert, supra note 5, at 455. 
73. Cal. Com. Code§ 10528(2) (West Supp. 1989). The Standby Committee Report states that 
this amendment to the official text "simply codifies the comment to 2A-528." Standby Committee 
Report, supra note 10, at 12. 
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any expenses saved in consequence of the default. 74 In response to the same 
criticisms made to sections 2A-527 and 2A-528 regarding the determination of 
damages as of the date of default,75 California 2A provides that the measure of 
damages under section 2A-529 is determined "as of the date of entry of 
judgment in favor of the lessor."76 
In addition, California 2A responds to criticisms that section 2A-529 does not 
require the lessor to mitigate damages,77 by requiring mitigation in all cases 
unless the leased property has been retained by the lessee. 78 The Standby 
Committee Report takes the position that the question of whether a lessor 
should be required to mitigate damages should be left to general legal principles 
applied on a case by case basis.79 The Standby Committee Report also reasons 
that if a lessor retains the goods for the remainder of the lease term without 
disposing of or using them, it is probably because there is no market for the 
goods, making mitigation impossible.80 
The California Bar Report and various other commentators have also pointed 
out the potential for abuse under section 2A-529(1)(a) if a lessor disposes of the 
goods after obtaining a judgment against the lessee but before the expiration of 
the lease term.81 Under such circumstances official section 2A-529(3) provides 
that a lessor's damages are then governed by sections 2A-527 and 2A-528.82 The 
commentators are concerned that the lessor in such a situation will seek to 
enforce the full amount of its judgment, without giving the lessee credit for the 
difference between damages calculated under either section 2A-527 or section 
2A-528 and the amount of the judgment which was based on damages calcu-
lated under section 2A-529.83 The California Bar Report also opposes the 
official text of section 2A-529( 1) because it relies on "a non-existent procedure 
for conducting a post-judgment proceeding to establish a market rent measure of 
damages" under section 2A-528, and for its "unrealistic and inefficient" expec-
74. U.C.C. § 2A-529. To recover under this section, the goods must have been accepted by the 
lessor. Id. 
75. See text accompanying notes 59-60, supra. 
76. Cal. Com. Code§ 10529(1)(a), (b) (West Supp. 1989). 
77. Rapson, supra note 6, at 900-03, 908-09; Benfield, supra note 6, at 936. One commentator 
has suggested that the official text is unclear as to whether the lessor is under a duty to mitigate, 
suggesting that an argument can be made that mitigation is required unless "the lessor is unable 
after reasonable effort to dispose of [the leased goods] at a reasonable price or the circumstances 
reasonably indicate that effort will be unavailing." Naples, supra note 5, at 356-57 (quoting U.C.C. 
§ 2A-529(1)(b)). See also Herbert, supra note 5, at 456. 
78. Cal. Com. Code§ 10529(1). 
79. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 5 (citing Benfield, supra note 6, at 936-50). 
Professor Benfield suggests that the implied obligation of good faith found in the Code and common 
law principles applicable to transactions governed by article 2A should require the lessor to mitigate 
damages. Benfield, supra note 6, at 938-40. 
80. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 6. 
81. See, e.g., California Bar Report, supra note 9, at 1042; Rapson, supra note 6, at 90~7; 
Herbert, supra note 5, at 456-57. 
82. U.C.C. § 2A-529(3). 
83. Rapson, supra note 6, at 906-07. 
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tation that a lessee would seek to restrain a lessor's enforcement of its judgment 
to determine whether the lessor is still in possession of the leased property.84 
California 2A addresses these concerns by expressly requiring the lessor to 
"cause an appropriate credit to be provided against any judgment for damages 
to the extent that the amount of the judgment exceeds the recovery available 
pursuant to Section 10527 or 10528."85 In explaining why the California 
nonuniform amendment is not necessary, the Standby Committee Report points 
out that in the event a lessor does not give the lessee a proper credit on a 
postjudgment disposition of the leased property, the lessor would be liable to the 
lessee for wrongful levy.86 The Standby Committee Report also notes that, even 
under California 2A, the burden is still on the lessee to initiate action against 
the lessor to enforce its rights if the lessor fails properly to amend its judgment. 87 
The final nonuniform California amendment to article 2A involves subsection 
4 of section 2A-529. The official text provides that once the lessee has satisfied a 
judgment obtained by the lessor, it may use any goods not disposed of by the 
lessor for the remaining term of the lease. 88 California's section 2A-529( 4) 
contains the additional provision that such a lessee must comply with all of the 
other terms and conditions of the lease while it is in possession of the leased 
goods.89 
LESSOR'S RESIDUAL VALUE 
Article 2A deals with the interests of the lessor and the lessee under a lease 
contract and not with the lessor's residual interest in the leased property. While 
the lessor's rights in and to the residual interest in the leased property are 
discussed in the official comments to article 2A,90 the California Bar Report 
expresses a concern that there is no specific reference to the lessor's residual 
interest in the official text of article 2A.91 To address this concern, California 2A 
adds a new section to the statute which provides that: 
In addition to any other recovery permitted by this division, the lessor shall 
be entitled to recover from the lessee an amount that will fully compensate 
84. California Bar Report, supra note 9, at 1042. 
85. Cal. Com. Code§ 10529(3) (West Supp. 1989). 
86. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 6 (citing Miller, Puckett & Suggs, supra note 
2, at 439 n.211 (pointing out that a lessor that does not give the lessee credit, but enforces the entire 
judgment, would be liable for wrongful levy, entitling the lessee to consequential and punitive 
damages)). See also U.C.C. § 2A-523 comment 11 (providing that the nature of post-judgment 
proceedings to reduce the judgment to the amount recoverable under § 2A-527 or § 2A-528 and the 
sanctions for any abuse by the lessor are to be determined by other law). 
87. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 6. 
88. U.C.C. § 2A-529(4). 
89. Cal. Com. Code § 10529(4). The Standby Committee Report states that this amendment 
"makes explicit what is implicit." Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 13. 
90. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2A-525, 2A-528 comments. 
91. California Bar Report, supra note 9, at 1045. 
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the lessor for any loss of or damage to the lessor's residual interest in the 
goods caused by the default of the lessee.92 
The Standby Committee Report takes the position this new section is unnec-
essary and that the protection of a lessor's residual interest in the leased 
property should be left to "well-established property and other law" outside of 
the Uniform Commercial Code.93 
92. Cal. Com. Code § 10532. 
93. Standby Committee Report, supra note 10, at 5 (finding that California's § 10532 is "an 
attempt to create a less than level playing field for the lessee" and recommending that it not be 
followed). 
